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Abstract
Over the last couple of decades evidence-based psychotherapies have flourished,
and there are now therapies that are well-established for a wide range of problems.
At the same time the mental-health burden is still enormous, and challenges to
the dissemination of treatments are substantial. Despite the considerable gains in
knowledge that have been made, many issues remain unsolved, and there are many
reasons to be skeptical of the current quality of the evidence.
The aim of this thesis was to explore methodological challenges that impact the
evaluation of psychological treatments in general but also gambling treatment trials
specifically. In the first part, I present a broader overview of some of the contemporary
issues that concern the scientific investigation of psychotherapies. Two issues are then
explored in more detail, 1) the broader issue of therapist effects in longitudinal studies,
and 2) the more specific issue of analyzing semicontinuous data as a treatment outcome.
After expanding on these issues, the findings are then used in two clinical gambling
studies.
In Study I, we investigated the consequences of ignoring therapist effects in longitudinal
data. We derived what factors impact the type I errors, and performed an extensive
simulation study. The empirical simulation results validated the analytical results and
showed that even when 5% of the variance in slopes is at the therapist level, the type
I errors can be substantially inflated. When analyzing data from longitudinal studies,
investigators should account for the possibility that therapists might have different
overall slopes. In an LMM, this can be accounted for by including a random slope at the
therapist level. In order to help investigators plan multilevel longitudinal studies, an R
package (powerlmm) was developed.
In Study II, we investigated the challenges of estimating treatment effects in gambling
studies using gambling expenditure as an outcome. Gambling outcomes are typically
very skewed and can include a large number of zeros. Investigators typically try
to analyze such data mostly by log transforming the outcome, or continue with a
standard analysis based on normally distributed residuals. In this paper, we propose
that a marginalized two-part model can be a more attractive option. We compared
the performance of the proposed two-part model to the typical methods used by
investigators. The performance of these models were compared using real data and via
different Monte Carlo simulation scenarios. The choice of an appropriate estimand for
treatment effects was also discussed, and we argue that gambling researchers should
primarily be concerned with the overall reduction in gambling losses.
In Study III, we applied and extended thework in Study II to investigate how concordant
gamblers and their concerned significant others (CSOs) were in their reports of gambling
losses. The sample consisted of problem gamblers and their CSOs participating in a
trial comparing individual CBT versus behavioral couples therapy. A total of 133 dyads
were included, and we used their baseline reports of gambling losses using the timeline
followback covering the last 30 days. Overall we found that there was a fair level of
agreement, ICC = .57, 95% CI [.48, .64]. There were some evidence that partner CSOs
had a higher level of agreement compared to parent CSOs, ICCdiff = .20, 95% CI [.03, .39].
In Study IV, we applied the results from Study I, II, and III to investigate the effects
of an internet-delivered program aimed at the CSOs of treatment refusing problem
gamblers. In total, 100 CSOs of treatment-refusing problem gamblers were randomized
to either ten weeks of ICBT or a waitlist control. At posttest the intervention group
reported an improvement on the CSO’s emotional consequences (d = -0.90, 95% CI
[-1.47, -0.33]), relationship satisfaction (d = 0.41, 95% [0.05, 0.76]), anxiety (d = -0.45, 95%
[-0.81, -0.09]), depression (d = -0.49, 95% [-0.82, -0.16]). Any effects on the CSO’s reports
on gambling losses and on treatment-seeking were inconclusive. Problem gamblers
are hard to influence via their CSO proxies; however, the intervention had a clinically
meaningful effect on the CSO’s coping as measured by their emotional consequences,
anxiety, depression, and relationship satisfaction. Several methodological issues are
discussed in relation to this RCT. For transparency and for better pooling of data,
we also published the raw data, including all measured outcomes together with the
R scripts used to analyze the trial. The data and scripts can be downloaded from
https://osf.io/awtg7.
Psychotherapy researchers face significant challenges, and there is a great need for
high-quality psychotherapy trials, a better appreciation of the methodological issues,
and more transparent reporting practices. Hopefully, improvements to psychotherapy
research will follow, and that these improvements will improve clinical practice and
reduce the mental health burden in general.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Like all therapists, I personally experience an utter inability not to believe I effect results
in individual cases; but as a psychologist I know it is foolish to take this conviction at
face value. In order to bring about the needed research, it will probably be necessary
for therapists and administrators to get really clear on this point: Our daily therapeutic
experiences, which (on good days!) make it hard for us to take Eysenck seriously, can be
explained within a crude statistical model of the patient-therapist population that assigns
very little specific ‘power’ to therapeutic intervention. If the majority of neurotics are in
‘unstable equilibrium’ and hence tend to improve under moderately favorable regimes,
those who are in therapy while improving will be talking about their current actions
and feelings in the sessions. Client and therapist will naturally attribute changes to the
therapy.”
– Paul E. Meehl (1955)
Over the last couple of decades evidence-based psychotherapies have flourished, and
there are now therapies that are well-established for a wide range of problems (Nathan
& Gorman, 2015). At the same time the mental-health burden is still enormous, and
challenges to the dissemination of treatments are substantial (Holmes et al., 2018).
While some celebrate the enormous achievements made by the evidence-based therapy
movement, others are more concerned about the quality of the evidence.
In the clinical sciences, especially in the biomedical ones, the issues of research quality
has had some vocal critics. In 1994 Doug Altman published his famous editorial The
scandal of poor medical research which begins with the widely spread phrase “We need
less research, better research, and research done for the right reasons” (Altman, 1994).
In an attempt to improve the reporting of clinical trials, the CONSORT statement was
published 1996. The threat of various biases received increased attention ten years
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later when Ioannidis (2005) published the highly influential and discussed paper Why
most published research findings are false. Similarly, Chalmers & Glasziou (2009) estimated
that 85% of the investments in biomedical research are wasted, due to a combination
of researchers focusing on outcomes that are not important to patients and clinicians,
flawed research designs, studies never being published, and an underreporting or lack
of transparency when findings are reported. The Lancet published a special series on
increasing value and reducing research waste, where Macleod et al. (2014) argues that
initially promising findings that fail to improve healthcare outcomes are the norm.
In psychology, the most active discussion regarding research quality has been
by experimental and social psychologists. Perhaps, most famously through the
reproducibility project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), where a large team of
researchers tried to replicate 100 psychological experiments. In a large part of the
replication attempts they found much weaker evidence compared to the original
investigation. Likewise, in several influential papers, different authors have pointed
out that several questionable research practices could contribute to untrustworthy
studies (Gelman, 2013; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), and highlighted the
wrong incentives at play (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl,
2012). Many of these concerns are likely behind the growing open science movement,
consisting of people advocating for a more transparent and open science (Nosek et al.,
2012; Wallach, Boyack, & Ioannidis, 2018).
How is the situation in clinical psychology? Are our results more robust and our trials
more transparently reported? The replicability crisis has been frequently discussed in
psychology in general, and as mentioned, especially in social psychology. However,
clinical psychology has, according to some, been uninterested in participating in the
discussion (Hengartner, 2018; Tackett et al., 2017). Although the focus on open science
might be new, in the subfield of psychotherapy research, an active debate has been going
on for decades about the quality of psychotherapy research. In 1952 Eysenck published
a review claiming that psychotherapy was ineffective and that change could largely be
attributed to spontaneous remission (Eysenck, 1952), which spurred a heated discussion.
Back when Eysenck published his critique the evidence for (and against) psychotherapy
was mostly based on anecdotal clinical observations. Now several decades later,
both clinicians and researchers act as if psychotherapy has clearly been established
as eﬀicacious in gold-standard and high-quality randomized controlled trials (RCTs).
Although substantial gains in knowledge have beenmade, many issues remain unsolved,
and there are many reasons to be skeptical of the current quality of the evidence. In
the first part of this thesis, I give an overview of the broader discussion about the
contemporary issues that concern the scientific investigation of psychotherapies, and
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threaten the validity of psychological treatment research. After the broader overview,
I present a more detailed background to the two major issues investigated in Study
I and II. Chapter 3 covers therapist effects and Section 4.2 semicontinuous gambling
data. In Chapter 4, I cover gambling disorder and especially research that focuses on
the concerned significant others (CSOs) of problem gamblers.
Skärholmen, Oktober 2019
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Chapter 2
General Issues in Psychotherapy Research
“So why describe them again? Our response was that many in the field of psychotherapy
research are not aware of these fundamental problems, and are very much internally
oriented with little knowledge about major developments in the methodologies in the
broader biomedical field.”
– Cuijpers, Karyotaki, Reijnders, & Ebert (2018, p. 1)
Psychotherapy researchers have generally focused on three questions: what treatment
works, for whom does it work, and how does it work? These questions go back to the
strategic outcomes proposed by Paul (1967): “What treatment, by whom, is most effective
for this individual with that specific problem, and under which set of circumstances?”
(p. 112). In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on these three questions and explore
specific issues that are threats to the conclusions we draw from the literature.
2.1 How Well Do Treatments Work? Issues Estimating Treatment
Effects
Claims that psychotherapies are eﬀicacious for a wide range of problems are ubiquitous
(Cuijpers et al., 2016; Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). Some even argue
that the evidence of eﬀicacy and specificity are so strong that some psychotherapies are
better called psychological treatments (Barlow, 2004). In this section, I will cover different
biases and flaws that are threats to the quality of the evidence. As noted by Leichsenring
et al. (2017), although, biases are recognized in the literature, several important biases
are not controlled for, and as stated by Cuijpers et al. (2018a), psychotherapy researchers
tend not to be aware of the fundamental problems.
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2.1.1 Defining Treatment Effects
The psychotherapy literature is filled with reports that interchangeably use the terms:
treatment outcome, treatment response, treatment effect, and outcome of treatment.
Some authors use these terms when referring to the observed outcomes after treatment,
and others when referring to the comparative difference between the outcomes in a
control condition versus a treatment condition. Clearly, the outcome after treatment
and the relative difference between the two groups are two different targets. Thus,
before discussing specific biases, it is worthwhile to define what we mean by “treatment
effects” and what trials try to estimate. In the causal inference literature, the treatment
effect is often defined using potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974). For a single patient that
treatment effect is,
Δi = Yi(1)− Yi(0).
Here Yi(1) represents the potential outcome if the patient enters treatment, and Yi(0) the
potential outcome if the patient decides to continue without treatment—representing
the “what-if” scenario of what would have happened had the patient not decided to
enter therapy. Thus, the causal effect is the relative eﬀicacy of a treatment outcome
compared to a counterfactual outcome. It should be evident that it is fundamentally
impossible to observe this effect—we cannot simultaneously observe a patient’s outcome
after treatment and the treatment-free outcome. This fact is called the fundamental problem
of causal inference (Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974).
Instead, the usual causal estimand, i.e. the target of eﬀicacy studies, is the average
treatment effect (ATE), which under random assigment can be shown to be equal to
(Holland, 1986),
ATE = Δ = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)]
= E[Yi(1)]− E[Yi(0)]
= E[Yi(1) | Zi = 1]− E[Yi(0) | Zi = 0]
= E[Yi | Zi = 1]− E[Yi | Zi = 0],
where Z indicates the outcome of the random treatment allocationwith Z = 0 represents
being assigned to the control condition and Z = 1 being assigned to the treatment
condition. This equation might look more complicated than it is. It simply tells us that
we can estimate the average treatment effect in the population by comparing the average
outcome in the treatment group to the average outcome in the control group. Thus, the
often-criticized focus on group-level effects in RCTs is more caused by a necessity rather
than an uninterest in the individual causal effects. Moreover, it does not follow that
we must believe that the treatment effect is the same for all patients—it is still possible
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that individual-level treatment effects vary. However, we cannot directly observe those
effects, so the ATE is our best guess what effect a treatment would have for a patient
picked at random from the population. It is important to remember this “fundamental
reality of causal analysis” (p. 14, Morgan & Winship, 2014), because as we will see later,
investigators frequently forget this and draw conclusions about individual-level effects
that could never be observed.
However, the effect of randomization is not everlasting, and the effect is frequently
broken in trials; participants can deviate from their assigned treatments, e.g., miss
sessions, fail to complete homework assignments, or simply drop out from the
treatment. For those reasons, most RCTs use the intention-to-treat (ITT) comparison,
where participants are analyzed according to how they were randomized. The ITT
comparison is different from the ATE in that we are now evaluating the impact of the
random allocation, i.e., the impact of offering treatment (Hernán & Hernández-Díaz,
2012). The ITT and ATE effects would be equivalent under perfect adherence and no
dropout. Thus, from the point of view of trying to evaluate the eﬀicacy of a treatment,
psychotherapy trials could aptly be described as “broken trials” (Barnard, Frangakis,
Hill, & Rubin, 2003), or as “longitudinal studies with baseline randomization” (Toh &
Hernán, 2008).
Some investigators recognize the limitations of the ITT comparison in relation to
estimating the eﬀicacy of a treatment. Unfortunately, they often perform a “naive”
per-protocol analysis to estimate the effect among those who adhered to the treatment.
However, adherence is not experimentally manipulated; hence, the sample in the
per-protocol analysis will likely be partially self-selected and prone to time-varying
confounding, and valid inference would require dealing with those issues (Dunn,
Maracy, & Tomenson, 2005; Hernán & Hernández-Díaz, 2012; Mohammad Maracy &
Graham Dunn, 2011). Despite the challenges of estimating the causal effect among
treatment completers, it is still worthwhile to remember that an ITT comparison
might not be synonymous with eﬀicacy in neither the mind of clinicians nor patients.
Personally, either as a patient or a clinician, I would want to know the expected effect of
an intervention if I actually complete it.
2.1.2 Comparators
There is an extensive disagreement regarding the choice of counterfactual in
psychotherapy studies, i.e., the choice of the control condition. Trials investigating
pharmacological therapies have the double-blind placebo RCT as the ideal—where
the treatment effect is attributable to the active ingredients. For psychotherapy trials,
the choice of comparison is not as straight-forward, and there is a large disagreement
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among researchers. The disagreement can be summarised as: should non-specific
effects be included in the causal treatment effect? Some would define the treatment
effect as the effect that is above and beyond the effect of having contact with a warm
and empathic therapist, and try to control for most of the non-specific effects (Gold et
al., 2017; Guidi et al., 2018), using some type of “psychotherapy placebo.” Proponents
of the importance of common factors (non-specific) effects have called placebo controls
in psychotherapy a flawed concept (Wampold, Frost, & Yulish, 2016), see Section 2.2.1
on page 11 for a background to the common factors theory. Much of the discussion
is related to a difference in the view of what constitutes a treatment effect. From a
common factors perspective it would be strange to try to control for the effect of the
patient-therapist relation or expectation effects, and it would be conceptually hard to
design an intervention where these are “placebo” components. Kirsch, Wampold, &
Kelley (2016) writes: “in evaluating the eﬀicacy of psychotherapy, the placebo effect
cannot and should not be controlled” (p. 121), and Kirsch (2005) notes that “it is not
clear how the effects of placebos are any less specific than any other psychologically
produced effects.” (p. 797).
However, proponents of specific effects claim that most of the therapyworks by targeting
and modifying specific processes related to the psychopathology. Naturally, from this
point-of-view, investigators claiming that non-specific effects are the principal treatment
mechanism should control for non-specific effects (Mohr et al., 2009).
Most investigators probably agree that an inert psychotherapy placebo condition that
can be blinded is challenging to construct, which has lead to a discussion about what the
appropriate comparator should be. It is possible that these challenges were instrumental
in the adoption of waitlist controls—a comparator that has received ample criticism
(Cristea, 2018). Several meta-analyses have provided evidence that a waitlist act as weak
control condition (Huhn et al., 2014; Khan, Faucett, Lichtenberg, Kirsch, & Brown, 2012),
with effects lower than expected by the natural course of spontaneous remission. This
nocebo effect has been found in multiple meta-analyses (Cuijpers et al., 2016; Furukawa
et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2012).
2.1.3 Biases, Was Eysenck Right?
There aremultiple sources that could bias the estimates of treatment effects. Researchers’
allegiance to the studied psychotherapy has frequently been brought up as a risk
(Luborsky et al., 1999). Munder, Brütsch, Leonhart, Gerger, & Barth (2013) performed a
meta-analysis of meta-analyses and found that the association between allegiance and
outcome was, r = .262, p = .002. There are many plausible ways investigators’ allegiance
could bias treatment effects (cf., Luborsky et al., 1999; Coyne & Kok, 2014; Cuijpers
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Figure 2.1: Allegiance and the outcome could share a common cause, reflecting the fact
that both are influenced by the true eﬀicacy of a treatment
& Cristea, 2016), they could: 1) pick a weaker control condition, 2) avoid publishing
negative findings, 3) selectively report outcomes favoring their preferred treatment,
4) compare various different statistical models and pick the one that gives the most
favorable results, 5) be more enthusiastic toward their prefered treatment and create
stronger expectations in participants assigned to it, 6) recruit more competent therapists
providing the preferred treatment, and 7) they can pick outcomes more responsive
to their intervention. Naturally, these questionable practices need not be consciously
performed by the investigator. Moreover, as Leykin & DeRubeis (2009) noted, the
allegiance-outcome association might be a case of reverse causality, and that the causal
effect might reflect “nature”. Some researchers might have an allegiance to a treatment
because it is actually superior. Similarly, allegiance and outcome could be concidered
to share a common cause, as shown in Figure 2.1, thus, allegiance and outcome would
not need to be causally realated. Moreover, it is possible that treatment effects from
studies by investigators with high allegiance give more correct eﬀicacy estimates, as
they are more likely to be delivered by experts in the intervention (Gaffan, Tsaousis,
& Kemp-Wheeler, 1995; Leykin & DeRubeis, 2009). Thus, bias would arise if there is
differential competence between treatments which would need to be balanced to avoid
bias (Hollon, 1999).
A real threat that can bias results are the unhealthy incentives in science, where you are
not evaluated by the quality of your work but on the number of publications and ranking
of the journals where you publish (Bakker et al., 2012). As Nosek et al. (2012) noted,
there is “a disconnect between what is good for scientists and what is good for science.”
Indeed, this is also true for psychotherapy researchers and combined with allegiance it
could lead to an unhealthy flexibility in the data analysis, and make investigators act
as if a hypothesis was specified a priori when it was not, i.e., “hypothesizing after the
results are known” (HARKing; Kerr, 1998). Even without allegiance, common problems
in science are likely to apply to psychotherapy researchers; such as, the problems
with outcome switching and selective reporting of studies that are not prospectively
registered, enabling investigators to act as if a secondary outcome was the primary.
Bradley, Rucklidge, &Mulder (2017) reviewed trials published between 2010 and 2014 in
the five journals with the highest journal impact factor. Out of 112 trials, about 12%were
prospectively and correctly registered. About half of the correctly and prospectively
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registered trials showed signs of selective outcome reporting (7 out of 13 trials), leading
to the authors to the stark conclusion:
“We cannot currently have confidence in the results being reported in
psychotherapy trials given there is no means of verifying for most trials that
investigators have analyzed their data without bias” (p. 65).
Cybulski, Mayo-Wilson, & Grant (2016) reported similar numbers after reviewing
163 trials published in 2013: 15% were prospectively registered, and only two were
prospectively registered and fully described their primary outcome. Azar, Riehm,
McKay, & Thombs (2015) reviewed all trials published in one of the top clinical
psychology journals, the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, and found a
similarly small proportion of preregistrations (17%, 12/70 studies).
Concerns for biasing effects of these research practices should not be taken lightly.
More recent meta-analyses shows that the effects of CBT are small to moderate in
methodologically rigorous studies (Cuijpers et al., 2016, 2010b). There is even some
evidence, that when focusing on high-quality trials the effect of psychotherapy is
no longer clinically relevant (Cuijpers et al., 2014), and that publication bias most
likely contributes to an overestimation of the treatment effect (Cuijpers et al., 2010a;
Driessen, Hollon, Bockting, Cuijpers, & Turner, 2015), which in turn will have a negative
impact on psychotherapies’ replicability and trustworthiness (Leichsenring et al.,
2017). For instance, Flint, Cuijpers, Horder, Koole, & Munafò (2015) meta-analysed 149
psychotherapy studies and came to the conclusion that the studies included much more
significant findings than what would be expected. Recent reviews have also pointed
out that non-financial conflicts of interest are a cause of concern both in the reporting
of trials (Cristea & Ioannidis, 2018), and in systematic reviews (Lieb, Osten-Sacken,
Stoffers-Winterling, Reiss, & Barth, 2016). The fallibility of meta-analysis is nothing
new, Eysenck (1978) called it an “exercise in mega-silliness” and noted that it is hard to
overcome the problem of “garbage-in-garbage-out” (p. 517).
2.1.4 What Should the Treatment Affect?
Even if wemanage to estimate a treatment effect without bias, this might mean very little
if the thing we are measuring is unimportant or lack validity. Over the years, there have
been many debates about what outcomes we should focus on. Some have questioned
the symptom-reduction model, and argued that the focus should be on transsyndromal
symptom reduction such as resilience and social participation (Os, Guloksuz, Vijn,
Hafkenscheid, & Delespaul, 2019).
Selecting a relevant outcome domain is only the first issue—deciding how to measure
9
the target is even more challenging. In psychotherapy trials, it is common that an
outcome is measured using a patient- or clinician-rated scale where some aggregate
score, such as a sum score, is used as the outcome (Ogles, 2013). This would perhaps
be reasonable if all items measured the same thing, and the items’ importance was
appropriately weighted. However, there is also a growing discussion regarding if we
should instead focus on individual symptoms and their interactions. Some argue that
mental disorders are well described by the frequent view that a latent brain disorder is
a common cause of the observed symptoms and that a valid scale is a unidimensional
measure of this construct. Others have proposed that disorders are best viewed as to
have formed from causally interrelating symptoms (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). From
this view, the usual method of assessing treatment outcome by analyzing sum scores
from a questionnaire risks obfuscating important insights. For example, we could hold
the view that a person with a gambling problem gambles too much because there is a
latent neurological dysfunction that could be explained by neuroscientists—and that
such a dysfunction could be targeted psychopharmacologicaly. Alternatively, we could
focus on the actual symptoms and try to identify important symptoms and potential
causal pathways; a view that most behavioral therapists would recognize as important.
For instance, a simplified chain of symptoms could be: stress → gambling → debt →
more stress→ gambles to solve debt→ even more stress→ and so on. For this patient,
a good treatment outcome might be if we could help them reduce their stress and
gambling losses. For another patient, the losses might not be the central problem, but
that they spend too much time occupied with gambling so that other areas of their life
are negatively impacted.
Things get even more diﬀicult when trying to measure, for instance, depression, where
there is not a clear problematic behavior in the sameway as for problemgambling (Bagby,
Ryder, Schuller, &Marshall, 2004; Fried, 2017). There is a clear challenge in verifying that
a scale has the same meaning both in different groups and over time (Reise & Waller,
2009), if not, an outcome of 10 would mean different things for different people or at
posttest compared to baseline. Furthermore, if the scale ismultidimensional so that items
measure different constructs, then the treatment might affect one of these constructs,
which means that important improvement could be lost in the aggregated score (Bagby
et al., 2004).
Much more could be said about the measurement issues in psychotherapy studies.
However, true to the spirit of most published research, I will recognize measurement
issues as hugely important but focus very little on them in this thesis.
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2.2 How Do Treatments Work? Issues with Research on
Mechanisms and Mediators
If we acknowledge that standard psychotherapy trials struggled to provide robust
evidence both for a treatment’s eﬀicacy and its specificity, this leads to the questions how
do treatments work then? The discussion about how psychotherapy leads to change has
been debated for a long time. Before covering the issues with studying mechanisms, I
will first provide some background on the contrasting views of proponents of common
factors and specific effects.
2.2.1 Common Factors
Rosenzweig (1936) proposed that the important mechanisms are factors common to all
psychotherapies. Such common factors are often assumed to be the therapeutic alliance,
expectations, and empathy (Wampold & Imel, 2015). The common factors theory makes
the strong claim that benefits from psychotherapies operate via mechanisms that are
common to all psychotherapies.
The modern common factors theory that has been the most influential is the contextual
model (Wampold & Imel, 2015). The contextual model proposed three pathways by
which psychotherapy works: 1) the real relationship, 2) creating expectations, and
3) health-promoting actions (Wampold, 2015). Thus instead of targeting specific
ingredients, the contextual model sees psychotherapy as a social healing practice.
Wampold (2015) writes:
“the contextual model provides an alternative explanation for the benefits
of psychotherapy to ones that emphasize specific ingredients that are
purportedly beneficial for particular disorders due to remediation of an
identifiable deficit” (p. 270).
When therapy starts, the patient and the psychotherapist form a bond, and it is crucial
to establish an engaging and trusting relationship. The “real relationship” that forms
is thought to be healing in and of itself; the patient forms a human connection with an
emphatic individual that cares for their well-being. The psychotherapy then creates
expectations by providing a plausible explanation for the patient’s suffering and
offering a rationale for how to overcome the diﬀiculties. These expectations increase
the patient’s feelings of self-eﬀicacy that they can solve their problems. Thus, in
the contextual model, it is critical that the patient and the therapist believes in the
explanation and the proposed solutions. The third path, health-promoting actions,
include specific ingredients. However, in the contextual model, the therapeutic
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ingredients are thought to work because they influence the patient to do something that
is health-promoting. Perhaps the most striking difference to the view of proponents of
specific ingredients is shown in this passage by Wampold & Imel (2015):
“What is important for creating expectations is not the scientific validity of
the theory but the acceptance of the explanation for the disorder, as well as
therapeutic actions that are consistent with the explanation … The causes of
mental disorders are notoriously diﬀicult to determine … and for the sake
of creating expectation are irrelevant. If the client believes the explanation
and that engaging in therapeutic actions will improve the quality of their
life or help them overcome or cope with their problems, expectations will be
created and will produce benefits.” (p. 59)
In an often referred to pie chart, Lambert (1992) state that 30% of the change can be
attributed to common factors and 15% to specific effects. Although, Wampold & Imel
(2015) notes that “[s]uch attempts are flawed for several reasons. First, partitioning
variability in outcomes to various sources assumes that the sources are independent,
which they are not” (p. 256), yet they still include a similar table that is also often
referred to. For instance, Wampold & Imel (2015) claim that alliance explains 7.5%
of the variance, whereas the difference between psychotherapies explains less than
1% of the variance. However, in my opinion, these types of presentations are highly
misleading and are of very little value. As covered previously, the target if a trial is
not to explain variance in outcomes, it is to estimate a causal treatment effect. It is
important to remember that the treatment effect is comparative, and correlating alliance
with, e.g., the outcome after treatment does not mean that 7.5% of the treatment effect is
explained by the alliance. Thus, even though it is possible to convert both effect sizes to
a percentage, one still has to remember that two fundamentally different quantities are
being compared—and that such a comparison makes no sense.
From the common factors perspective, the specific ingredients are not what drives
the treatment effect. Closely related to this proposition is the “dodo bird verdict”,
which says that all bona fide psychotherapies intended to be therapeutic have similar
effects. The name “Dodo bird” originates from a quote from Alice in Wonderland used
by Rosenzweig (1936): “At last the Dodo said, ‘Everybody has won, and all must have
prizes’ ” (p. 412). Proponents of common factors argue that instead of focusing on
specific effects, researchers should try to understand how to maximize the effects of
therapeutic alliance and expectation effects (Kirsch et al., 2016; Wampold & Imel, 2015).
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2.2.2 Specific Effects
In some therapy traditions, specific effects are thought to be the main factor by which
the treatment works (e.g., in CBT). From this perspective, a specific ingredient targets a
specific dysfunction that is thought to have an important effect on the psychopathology.
For instance, in a behavior therapy for a person with an addictive disorder, such as
gambling, the therapist might theoretize that the patient is engaging in problematic
gambling because they are depressed and that gambling offers a way of escaping these
feelings. This process is then specifically targeted in therapy by encouraging the patient
to engage in other activities that also reduce the depressive feelings, but without the
negative consequences caused by gambling. In other cases, it can be conceptualized that
the gambling is caused by a lack of control of impulses, and that the treatment should
target that dysfunction.
Proponents of specific effects do not generally ignore the importance of common, or
nonspecific, factors. However, it is thought that the specific ingredients have important
effects and that they work by targeting the psychopathology (Barlow, 2004). Barlow
(2004) notes that these treatments “are specifically tailored to the pathological process
that is causing the impairment and distress” (p. 873). True to the medical model, these
techniques should preferably be derived from basic sciences, such as behavioral and
cognitive sciences.
2.2.3 Studying Mechanisms
One might wonder why, after decades of psychotherapy research, is there no irrefutable
evidence for either specific or non-specific effects? In this section, I will cover studies
of mechanisms and the monumental, and often overlooked, challenges associated with
such investigations.
Much hope has been put in improving psychotherapies by better understanding its
mechanisms (Holmes et al., 2018; Kazdin, 2011; Nock, 2007). Barlow, Bullis, Comer, &
Ametaj (2013) writes: “Progress in identifying and confirming mechanisms of actions
will be one of the most eﬀicient methods for improving treatment eﬀicacy” (p. 14).
Naturally, it is a worthwhile goal to try to identify a specific mechanism that drives
the treatment effect. If such a causal process could be identified, the hope is that
psychotherapies could be improved by distilling the eﬀicacious mechanism of change
(Barlow et al., 2013). Alternatively, if we modify a treatment, for instance, from a
face-to-face setting into a smart-phone app or an internet treatment—understanding
criticalmechanisms could help, especially if the therapeutic alliance is shown to be a vital
component (Kazdin, 2011). In The Lancet Psychiatry Commission on psychological treatments
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research in tomorrow’s scienceHolmes et al. (2018) writes: “Research on these mechanisms
has considerable scope to facilitate treatment innovation” (p. 237), and they call for
greater collaboration between basic researchers and clinical researchers—reminiscing
the seminal mechanistic studies in the 1950s and 1960s that are now cornerstones of
today’s evidence-based therapies.
From a slightly different perspective, Hofmann and Hayes have coined the term
process-based therapy (Hayes et al., 2018; Hofmann & Hayes, 2018). As an alternative to
targeting distinct syndromes via specific treatments, they argue for an expansion of
the strategic outcomes proposed by Paul (1967). According to them, psychotherapy
researchers should focus on core evidence-based processes and move away from
treatment packages. In their view, the investigation of mediators and moderators will
be crucial in this process—which should lead to a rise in mediation and moderation
studies.
However, even ifwe could rule out non-specific effects via placebo control conditions—or
use a dismantling study to show that removing a component impacts the outcome—could
we then deduce that the psychotherapyworks through specific ingredients? That answer
is that it depends on what assumption you are willing to make. Such designs could
point towards essential components, but they would not necessarily explain how the
mechanism works (Kazdin, 2007). As I will cover in this section, the strong assumptions
that are needed to identify amechanism either via statistical analysis or via experimental
manipulation are largely underappreciated by psychotherapy researchers.
2.2.4 Mediation Analysis
Statisticalmediation analysis is likely themost commonmethod usedwhen investigating
mechanisms. A mediator is an intervening variable that transmits some or all of the
effect of the treatment on the outcome (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The mediated effect, often
called the indirect effect, gives us the expected change in the outcome caused by the
treatment’s effect on the mediator, while the direct effect of treatment is the total effect
of all the remaining causal mechanisms. From a CBT-perspective, an apparent mediator
would be adherence to homework assignments, where one would expect that part of
the treatment effect would be transmitted via the completion of homework assignments.
The relationship between homework and treatment effects has received a lot of attention
(Burns & Spangler, 2000; Driessen & Hollon, 2010). Common factor proponents, on the
other hand, have focused most attention on the allegiance between patient and therapist
(Wampold, 2015), as stated byWampold (2005), “[t]he working alliance is the ubiquitous
common factor that has been claimed to be causal to outcomes” (p. 195).
The most influential paper on mediation analysis is probably by Baron & Kenny (1986),
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which at the time of writing has over 80,000 citations on Google Scholar. Figure 2.2 shows
a causal diagram depicting three scenarios involving either homework adherence or
alliance. The main challenge is that the mediator is not randomized, and therefore it is
likely that there is one or several variables that influence both themediator and outcome.
In (a), the standard mediation figure (Baron & Kenny, 1986) is shown, except that there
is a potentially unknown variable influencing both the mediator and the outcome.
When evaluating a causal diagram, the important question to ask is what arrows are
missing, and can such an assumption be justified. In the case of homework completion,
one could easily argue that the group of patients that complete more homework would
also have had relatively better outcomes had they been assigned to the control group,
i.e., their prognosis is better which is caused by, for instance, age and education. If we
have measured both age and education, then we can adjust for them, and the effect of
homework can be identified. In (b), the causal model is instead that it is allegiance that
mediates the outcome, and homework completion is just an effect of better allegiance
and not causally related to the outcome. Thus if we used homework as a mediator, we
would wrongly conclude that there is an effect of homework completion, while in fact it
is confounded by allegiance. Of course, the relationship between allegiance and outcome
could also be confounded. In (c), homework does mediate the treatment effect, but
the effect is influenced by a known and measured confounder (baseline functioning).
However, there is also an unknown confounder that influences both alliance and
outcome. In this scenario, we would identify the true effect of homework if we adjust
for baseline functioning and do not include allegiance in the model, as allegiance would
be a collider and bias the results. These are just three hypothetical examples of how
easily it is to draw the wrong conclusions from these types of observational data that
result from an RCT.
In the notation of the potential outcomes framework the indirect effect for a single patient
(Emsley, Dunn, & White, 2010; Imai, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2013), is written as,
indirect effect = Yi(1,Mi(1))− Yi(1,Mi(0))
and the direct effect of the treatment is,
direct effect = Yi(1,Mi(t))− Yi(0,Mi(t)).
Mi(1) is the level of the mediator under the treatment andMi(0) under the control. Thus,
the causal estimand representing themediated effect for a patient can bewritten as: their
outcome under the treatment at the level of the mediator that would occur if they were
assigned to the treatment compared to the outcome if the mediator was set to the level
that would occur had they received the control intervention. Alternatively, as Imai et al.
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(2013) described it: “what change would occur to the outcome if we change the mediator
from the value that would realize under the control condition… to the value that would
be observed under the treatment condition … while holding the treatment status at t”
(p. 8).
Considering how complex psychotherapy processes are one would assume that
researchers have paid careful attention to the causal assumptions underpinning
mediation analysis. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and the critique from
methodological experts has been vicious. One of the most basic sources of confusion,
seems to be how to even define treatment effects, and you can often see RCTs where
authors ignore the control group and look at relationships only in the treated group. As
noted by Dunn & Bentall (2007) “[t]his approach is based on the mistaken assumption
that the outcome of treatment (i.e., the outcome following treatment) is a measure of
that treatment’s effect.” (p. 4742) and they continue:
“Although there is an enormous methodological literature on the estimation
of the effects of mediators (particularly, in psychology … most of it
completely ignores the technical challenges raised by measurement errors in
the proposedmediators and by potential hidden confounding ofmediator(s)
and outcome.” (p. 4743).
The fact that (psychotherapy) researchers consistently make this unrealistic, and often
unstated and unjustified, assumption is also noted by Kenny (2008) who write: “all
too often persons conducting mediational analysis either do not realize that they are
conducting causal analyses or they fail to justify the assumptions that they have made.”
(p. 356). Similarly, Bullock, Green, & Ha (2010) writes, “[t]his warning has been issued
before by those who write about mediation analysis … but it seems to have escaped the
attention of the mainstream of the discipline” (p. 551). Dunn & Bentall (2007) put it a bit
more harshly:
“The assumptions concerning the lack of hidden confounding and
measurement errors are very rarely stated, let alone their validity discussed.
One suspects that the majority of investigators are oblivious of these two
requirements. One is left with the unsettling thought that the thousands of
investigations of mediational mechanisms in the psychological and other literatures
are of unknown and questionable value.” (p. 4743, italics added).
Their critique is unpleasant but, unfortunately, true in my experience. Considering that
Judd & Kenny (1981), noted the shortcomings with the classical mediational model in
1981, perhaps, some negativity from statisticians is understandable. Within the context
of psychotherapy, most texts on mediation analysis focus on the traditional approach.
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However, there are some papers that includes examples of how instrumental variables
and other statistical techniques can be used to help identify causal effect in the presence
of bothmeasurement error and confounding (Dunn&Bentall, 2007; MohammadMaracy
& Graham Dunn, 2011; Preacher, 2015; Valente, Pelham, Smyth, & MacKinnon, 2017).1
2.2.5 Experimental Manipulation of the Mediator
Psychotherapy researchers often mention that experimental manipulation of the
mediator would provide strong evidence for a causal mechanism (Kazdin, 2007). For
instance, Holmes et al. (2018) reasons that “[s]howing that experimental manipulation
of a proposedmechanism leads to symptom change is a powerfulmethod for validation”
(p. 244). Technically, experimental manipulation of the mediator provides evidence
for the M → Y path and not the Z → M → Y path. Even if we can also show that the
treatment has an impact on the mediator, Z → M, this is not suﬀicient to claim that the
treatment effect is transmitted via the mediator. Even under this scenario, where both
the treatment assignment and the mediator are experimentally manipulated, strong
assumptions are needed in order to interpret this as evidence for a causal indirect
effect (Imai et al., 2013)—and as we shall see it is not easy to claim that the required
assumptions hold for psychotherapies.
Both Imai et al. (2013) and Bullock et al. (2010) clearly details the challenges of studying
mediators using experimental manipulation. Especially relevant to psychotherapy
research is the issue that investigators need to show that the manipulation only affects
the proposed mediator and not other variables. Moreover, researchers also need to
show that the experimental manipulation does not influence the mediator differently
and in different individuals compared to how the treatment is assumed to shift the
mediator. This is important since the aim is to study how the treatment naturally
influences the outcome via the mediator, if the experimental manipulation achieves
this by different means and in different individuals then it would be hard to generalize
this causal relationship to the original treatment setting. In a psychotherapy trial, it
becomes conceptually challenging to imagine how one would manipulate the mediator
while holding the treatment constant. Even if we were to successfully experimentally
manipulate, say, homework adherence or therapist alliance, it would be incredibly
diﬀicult to claim that the treatment is not also changed. We would need to assume that
this manipulation of the mediator has no direct effect on the outcome. This means that a
patient’s treatment outcome would be assumed to be the same no matter if the mediator
(M) takes on value M = m naturally or by experimental manipulation. Which means
1I have posted R code and some empirical examples of how confounding and measurement error
leads to bias https://rpsychologist.com/adherence-analysis-IV-brms and https://rpsychologist.com/
mediation-confounding-ME
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that if we manipulate homework adherence patients must behave similarly under this
manipulation as if they had chosen the level of adherence naturally. Are we willing
to believe that a patient that naturally form a weak allegiance to the therapist behave
the same and have identical outcomes as a patient, that is somehow, “experimentally
manipulated” to have weak allegiance to the therapist? Imai et al. (2013) are explicit
about the importance of this assumption (the “consistency” assumption):
“The importance of assumption 3 cannot be overstated. Without it, the
second experiment provides no information about causal mechanisms
(although the average causal effect of manipulating the mediator under
each treatment status is identified). If this assumption cannot bemaintained,
then it is diﬀicult to learn about causal mechanisms by manipulating the
mediator” (p. 12)
From a clinical point of view, causal heterogeneity is easy to imagine. Most bona fide
psychotherapies consist of many different tools and hypothesize multiple different
pathways. As a clinician, you try to conceptualize each participants problem and
propose solutions tailored to this individual—with some you focus more on the
relationship and what happens in the therapy room, with others exposure-based
exercises in the real world seems more fitting. Obviously, we cannot directly observe
such causal heterogeneity.
2.2.6 The Dodo Bird and the Absence of Evidence Fallacy
As noted previously, identifying mechanisms is incredibly hard, and most published
papers are strictly correlational. Thus, empirical evidence for both common factors and
specific effects are very limited. However, common factor proponentsmostly point to the
fact that differences between therapies tend to be small (Mulder, Murray, & Rucklidge,
2017; Wampold & Imel, 2015), and that this Dodo bird conjecture is evidence of the
importance of common factors, or as stated by Wampold & Imel (2015):
”Evidence consistentwithRosenzweig’s claimof uniformeﬀicacy—commonly
referred to as the Dodo bird effect—is typically considered empirical
support for the conjecture that common factors are the eﬀicacious aspect of
psychotherapy” (p. 114)
There are several problems with the Dodo Bird verdict—in addition to the fact that it
says very little about mechanisms even if the proposition was true. A problem with the
common factors and dodo bird argument is that unbiased effects of eﬀicacy are tough to
observe. As noted earlier, ITT effects can be quite poor estimates of the causal treatment
effect. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that two psychotherapies produce similar effects
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if most patients simply never shown up to treatment. Clearly, as a patient, I would want
to know: what is the expected benefit if I show up to the treatment and complete it?
However, the next section will show that even under perfect adherence and no missing
data, it would be wrong to claim that a non-significant statistical test demonstrates that
two treatments have equivalent effects.
2.2.7 Non-inferiority and Equivalence Studies
Many treatment modalities are inferred to be equally eﬀicacious based on a statistical
misunderstanding. This fallacy was famously summarised by Altman & Bland (1995)
as: “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (p. 485). Many psychotherapies
have been deemed equally effective based on failing to reject the null hypothesis, i.e., a
test of H0 : d = 0, versus the alternative Ha : d ̸= 0. A non-significant result (usually
p > 0.05) does not warrant the conclusion that the null hypothesis of no difference is
supported. If traditional significance tests could be used in this way, it would mean that
a study with a smaller sample size would more often find evidence for the equivalence of
two treatments, compared to a study with a larger sample size. This is well known in the
methodological literature, where the appropriate test would be either a non-inferiority
or equivalence test (Greene, Morland, Durkalski, & Frueh, 2008; Piaggio et al., 2006;
Wellek, 2010). Non-inferiority and equivalence test have increasingly been used by
psychotherapy researchers (e.g., Leichsenring et al., 2018; Steinert, Munder, Rabung,
Hoyer, & Leichsenring, 2017), e.g., when comparing PDT vs. CBT (Driessen et al., 2013),
or when comparing an internet-delivered treatment versus a face-to-face treatment
(Lappalainen et al., 2014).
Simplified, we can say that the classical test is performed by checking if a confidence
interval (CI) includes zero or not, whereas, a non-inferiority test implies testing if the
lower end a CI is above −Δ, i.e., it tests if the new treatment is at least not worse than
the old gold-standard treatment by −Δ (H0 : d ≤ −Δ). An equivalence test checks
if the CI of the treatment effect falls within [−Δ, Δ], i.e. we test if the difference is not
larger than ±Δ (H0 : d ≤ −Δ or d ≥ Δ).2 Remembering that an equivalence test is
essentially trying to squeeze a CI within a small region, we can also see that equivalence
tests generally require large sample sizes. For example, an investigator planning to test if
two interventions are equivalent using a t-test with Δ = 0.2, would need approximately
500 participants per group and that is assuming there is no true difference—if a small
but clinically meaningless effect exists the sample size would need to be even larger (c.f.,
Julious, 2004).
2I have created an interactive explanation showing the difference between superiority, non-inferiority,
and equivalence test https://rpsychologist.com/d3/equivalence/
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Non-inferiority and equivalence trials are not without their challenges. The choice of Δ is
critical and an ongoing topic of discussion among psychotherapy researchers. In a recent
meta-analysis, Steinert et al. (2017) concluded that (standardized) margins range from
0.24 to 0.6 and therefore adopted a margin Δ = 0.25. However, Rief & Hofmann (2018)
argued that such a “… threshold is inflationary, hiding clinically meaningful differences
that might exist.” (p. 1393), and went so far as to recommend that Δ should be “90%
of the expected effects of the first-line treatments (e.g., a threshold SMD of ±0.05, if the
uncontrolled effect size is expected as SMD = 0.50).” Clearly, a Δ = 0.05 will protect
against degradation; however, as noted by Leichsenring et al. (2018) this would require
6,281 particpats per arm to reach 80% power.
The choice of Δ is not the only issues with non-inferiority and equivalence studies. As
mentioned earlier, ITT analyses tend to underestimate the true eﬀicacy of a treatment
and are thus viewed as conservative. For the very same reason, ITT analyses are
nonconservative with regards to testing non-inferiority or equivalence (Hernán &
Hernández-Díaz, 2012). Thus, one can argue that these designs are less robust to being
influenced by different biases; such as allegiance, non-adherence, or missing data.
2.3 For Whom Does the Treatment Work?
An alternative view to focusing on mechanisms and basic science in order to improve
patient outcomes is to instead better match patients to the treatments. From this
perspective, the way forward is either better treatment selection using predictive models
or more personalized treatments. In this section, I will cover some of the challenges and
misunderstandings that apply to these questions.
2.3.1 Identifying Treatment Responders
I would assume that most clinicians believe—as I do—that different patients benefit
differently from the treatment, i.e., that there exist treatment effect heterogeneity.
With some patients, you feel that there is very little progress, and with others that the
improvements are substantial. There have been many papers arguing that a noticeable
proportion of patients do not respond to treatment. For instance, Cuijpers, Karyotaki,
et al. (2014) writes that 48% of depressed patients receiving psychotherapy respond
to treatment (with “response” defined as a 50% reduction of symptoms). Researchers
constantly invent new ways to solve the “problem” of treatment non-responders,
such as: 1) trying match patients to the right treatment (Cohen & DeRubeis, 2018), 2)
employing an idiographic approach to tailor treatments to patients needs (Fisher, 2015;
Hofmann, Curtiss, & McNally, 2016), 3) identifying biomarkers such as genetic markers
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or brain imaging to predict non-responders (Insel, 2014). Clearly, trying to improve
therapy outcomes is laudable; however, most of these efforts ignore the fact that we
do not know how many or who responds to treatment. As I will cover in this section
providing evidence for such variation in treatment responses is much harder than most
think.
Figure 2.3 illustrates that the problem with identifying variation in treatment response
is—again—that the individual-level effects are unobservable. By only looking at the
patients’ change over time, we get the impression that their response to the treatment
varies substantially. However, as covered previously, we do not know how their
outcomes would have looked had they not received treatment—it is possible that
everyone benefited equally from the treatment. It should be evident that the baseline is
not a valid counterfactual for inferring (individual) treatment effects. The standard RCT
cannot tell us howmany of the patients benefited from the treatment, or even estimate if
there exists between-patient variance in treatment effects (Senn, 2004, 2016). Estimating
the variance in patient’s individual treatment effects would require a repeated cross-over
design where patients are repeatedly randomized (Senn, 2016). It is highly unlikely that
such a trial would be a feasible way of evaluating a psychotherapy.
Several journals require reporting some type of clinical significance. Often researchers
report how many patients have a reliable improvement and include a normative
comparison (Jacobson & Truax, 1991), or who improve by a certain percentage compared
to their baseline measure. Kendall, Marrs-Garcia, Nath, & Sheldrick (1999) states that
clinical significance answers the question: “[i]s the amount of change exhibited by an
individual participant large enough to be considered meaningful” (p. 283). Clearly,
these types of measures say very little about the clinical significance of a treatment
effect. One would think that these metrics are intended to be descriptive and show that,
e.g., a large proportion of patients still have residual symptoms. However, Jacobson,
Roberts, Berns, & McGlinchey (1999) clearly had causal ambitions with their measure:
“Jacobson and colleagues attempted to grapple with two limitations
prevalent in statistical comparisons between groups of treated clients. First,
such comparisons provide little or no information regarding the variability
in treatment response from person to person. Group means, for example, do
not in and of themselves indicate the proportion of participants who have
improved or recovered as a result of treatment. Thus, statistical comparisons
between groups shed little light on the proportion of participants in each
condition who have benefited from the treatment” (p. 300, italics added)
Of course, we could calculate the proportion of patients in the treatment and control
group that are in remission, or who have scores in the normal range. Then use the
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relative comparison as the treatment effect; however, now we have just dichotomized
a continuous outcome. It is not clear that such a dichotomization represents clinical
significance any better than the average treatment effect using the continuous outcome.
For instance, if we recruit a sample of patients with very high levels of symptom severity,
a relatively large treatment effect can be found while zero of the patients are classified
as recovered. Should we now conclude that the treatment had no clinically significant
benefit?
A simple thought experiment can easily demonstrate the faulty logic behind using
patients’ change over time as the basis of inferring clinical significance. Take the patient
in Figure 2.3 that deteriorated themost over time; this patient would be labeled as having
a reliable deterioration and as a treatment non-responder. Now, imagine, as shown
in the figure, that their—fundamentally unobservable—individual treatment effect is
positive, meaning, that had they not received treatment their deterioration would have
been even greater. Taken to the extreme, it is possible that the treatment kept them from
committing suicide. Thus, even though the patient is still highly depressed, it would be
strange to say that the treatment failed if the treatment actually saved their life.
2.3.2 Moderators and Personalized Psychotherapy
Variables that modify the treatment effect (moderators) are conceptually much easier
to identify than mediators—but the search for moderators is not without its challenges.
Research on moderators has a long history in psychotherapy research (Beutler, 1991;
Kazdin & Blase, 2011; Paul, 1967).
One pitfall when identifyingmoderators iswhen researchers perform separate subgroup
analysis and claim moderation when the treatment is significant in one group and not
in the other (e.g., in men versus women). Although, my impression is that it is fairly
well established among psychotherapy researchers that a moderating effect is identified
by looking at interaction effects, e.g., the moderator× treatment effects (Baron & Kenny,
1986).
The major issue with moderation analysis lies in identifying which moderators should
be tested. It is often hard to use theory to select plausible moderators, and a more
data-driven approach is then used. Testing many moderators reduces the chance that a
moderator will replicate in new samples. However, small sample sizes typically lead to
tests with low sensitivity to detect moderators that actually have a clinically meaningful
impact on the treatment effect. A further challenge is that it is hard to validate the
predictions made using the identified moderators. If we use a patient’s age, gender, and
education level to predict that they will improve by 10 points more if given PDT versus
CBT—how do we know that this prediction is accurate? After the patient has finished
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their PDT treatment using their observed outcome does not validate the prediction that
the relative improvement compared to CBT is 10 points.
The challenges of building clinical prediction models are much better covered in
biomedical literature than in the psychotherapy literature. In medicine, moderators
are generally called prescriptive or predictive markers (Janes, Brown, Huang, & Pepe,
2014). Before covering prescriptive models, it is useful to first look at prognostic
models, i.e., model that try to predict patients’ outcomes (not the effect of the
treatment). Best practices for clinical prediction models for prognostic variables are
well developed. However, in my experience, psychotherapy researchers tend to ignore
the recommendations; mostly by using variable selection strategies that are known to
overfit, such as stepwise methods, and report very few metrics on neither the internal
or external validity of the model (Bouwmeester et al., 2012; Steyerberg, 2009; Steyerberg
et al., 2018). For instance, if we have a prognostic model, we can make a prediction
for an individual and compare the prediction to their actual outcome (this agreement
between observed outcomes and prediction is called calibration). If we predict that a
patient will score ten on an outcome, then it is conceptually straight-forward just to
look how close the patient’s outcome is to ten. We can summarise such performances
using common performance metrics (Steyerberg et al., 2010), e.g., the mean squared
error (i.e., R2 if normalized) or look at calibration curves to see if the model makes
accurate predictions for the whole range of outcome values. Generally, a model will
perform best on the patients that were used when building the model. It is always
noise in the data, and a model that conforms too closely to the original sample,
and make accurate predictions for those patients, will most likely perform relatively
worse on a new sample. For a model to be useful, it should perform well with
new patients. However, in my experience, psychotherapy researchers seldom report
estimates of the out-of-sample performance; the performance of a predictor is often
reported as significant or non-significant, which says very little about the model’s
predictive performance. There are statistical methods to help reduce overfitting such as
cross-validation and penalized regression, and validation the model on an independent
sample (Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2001; Harrell, 2015; Steyerberg, 2009).
Prognostic models are important and can be useful when deciding if a patient needs
treatment; however, they do not tell us which patients are likely to benefit from which
treatment. What we want is a model that can predict if a patient is more or less likely to
benefit from, say, PDT treatment or CBT treatment. The challenges that apply to building
a prognostic model also applies to predicting treatment effect modification—except that
fundamental problem of causal inference makes it much harder to validate the model
(Fine & Pencina, 2015; Janes et al., 2014; Janes, Pepe, McShane, Sargent, & Heagerty,
2015; Kent, Steyerberg, & Klaveren, 2018), and the variable selection methods used
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with prognostic models tend to fail (Gunter, Zhu, & Murphy, 2007; Lu, Zhang, & Zeng,
2013). For instance, we can build a model that predicts that a patient is expected to
improve by 10 points more if given PDT compared CBT. However, we cannot assess
calibration by comparing the prediction to the observed outcome—as the individual
treatment effects are fundamentally unobservable. Thus, we cannot evaluate and
validate our prescriptive model using the same methods and metrics that are generally
used with clinical prediction models. Still, in order to build a useful treatment selection
model, multivariable prediction models need to be built. We could see if the selected
moderators are stable and replicate in a new sample. However, even if, for instance,
education and gender, are found to be robust moderators, the treatment effects could
vary substantially within these groups. For instance, based on my education and
gender, a model might predict that I will benefit by 10 points if I enter treatment A.
However, it is not easy to answer the question how accurate such a prediction is for
all patients with education = “university or higher” and gender = “male”. There are
recent attempts to overcome these problems by combining machine learning and causal
inference methods (Lipkovich, Dmitrienko, & D’Agostino, 2017; Luedtke & van der
Laan, 2017; van Klaveren, Steyerberg, Serruys, & Kent, 2018). However, careful attention
should be paid to the unverifiable assumptions that these models need to make—and if
it is likely that they hold for psychotherapy treatment selection.
From a practical point-of-view, evaluating the potential clinical usefulness of the
decisions made using the predictive model are probably best evaluated in a new RCT
where it can be compared to another selection strategy, e.g., if the psychotherapist and
the patient selects a treatment without any aid of the new prediction model (Kent et al.,
2018). Some would also argue that we should include therapist selection in this decision
procedure.
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Figure 2.2: A causal diagram of how homework or alliance mediates a treatment effect,
where Z represent treatment assignment. a) Shows the typicalmediation diagram except
that (?) represents a known (L) or an unknown (U) common cause of both homework
and the outcome. (b) Shows a simplified scenario were alliance mediates the treatment
outcome, and alliance causes homework adherence, while homework has no effect on
the outcome. (c) Shows a scenario where homework mediates some of the effect, and
where homework adherence influences allegiance and an unknown variable influences
both allegiance and the outcome.
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Figure 2.3: The problem of inferring treatment effects on the individual level. (a) Shows
the observed change during the treatment, and (b) includes the counterfactual slopes
that would have been observed had the participants not recieved treatment. The figure
is a longitudinal adaption of Figure 1 in Senn (2016).
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Chapter 3
Therapist Effects
A major challenge when evaluating and designing psychological interventions is the
possibility that some therapists consistently perform better than others (Lambert, 2013;
Norcross, Beutler, & Levant, 2006), which introduces a correlation among subjects
belonging to the same therapist. This has been extensively covered for cross-sectional
analysis (Baldwin et al., 2011; Wampold & Serlin, 2000). However, with the increased
popularity of longitudinal analyses using linear mixed-effects models, these old issues
return in a new light.
Among methodologists and statisticians, there is a broad consensus that clustering
due to therapists need to be accounted for, and that ignoring a level of nesting will
increase the risk of committing a type I error. This was pointed out by Meehl already
back in 1955, and Martindale back in 1978, who called it the “therapist-as-fixed-effect
fallacy”. Moreover, Kiesler (1966) also pointed out the unreasonable assumption of
uniform therapist outcomes. Not surprisingly, the reporting of clustering effects is
part of the CONSORT statement for non-pharmacological treatments (Grant et al.,
2018). Unfortunately, reviews show that investigators mostly do not report therapist
effects, and worse, do not adjust their statistical analyses. Martindale (1978) reviewed 33
psychotherapy studies and concluded that few accounted for clustering. Crits-christoph
& Mintz (1991) reviewed 140 articles in the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
between 1980 and 1990 and found that two-thirds of the studies completely ignored the
therapist factor. The journal Psychotherapy Research dedicated a whole special issue to
therapist effects (Hill, 2006). A more recent study also points out the problems with this
type of treatment-related clustering, and that it still continues to be ignored (Walwyn &
Roberts, 2015). Similarly, when these individual RCTs are included in a meta-analysis,
the problem of therapist effect also applies to the meta-analysis, leading to type I errors
that are higher than the specified α-level (Owen, Drinane, Idigo, & Valentine, 2015;
27
Walwyn & Roberts, 2015).
3.1 How Much Variance is Accounted for by Therapists?
Most studies that have investigated therapist effects find that only a small proportion
of the variance in the outcomes after treatment is attributable to the therapists. For
eﬀicacy studies, most estimates range from 5 to 10%, with larger numbers being found
in naturalistic studies (Baldwin et al., 2011; Kim, Wampold, & Bolt, 2006). In a simple
cross-sectional analysis, the proportion of variance at the therapist level is also the
intra-class correlation (ICC), which gives the correlation between any two randomly
picked patients belonging to the same therapist (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
3.2 The Design Effect
Small ICCs does not mean that the impact on the type I errors is small. The effect of
ignoring this multilevel hierarchy on a parameter’s standard error (SE) is often called
the design effect (Snijders, 2005), which is defined as:
Deff =
SEcorrect
SEincorrect
.
Which tells us by how much we need to multiply the incorrect standard errors to get
the correct standard errors. For a cross-sectional analysis with therapists nested within
treatments, the design effect is:
Deff =
√
(1+ (n¯2 − 1)ρ1.
Where ρ1 is the intra-class correlation (ICC) at the therapist level, and n¯2 is the average
number of subjects per therapist.
3.3 Therapist or Treatment?
Many authors have discussed the problems of disentangling therapist effects from
treatment effects (Chambless & Hollon, 2012; Elkin, 1999). Walwyn & Roberts (2010)
discussed the threats of therapist effects to a study’s internal and external validity. They
noted that when therapists are not randomized to treatments, it is possible that therapist
characteristics differ between treatments. In a sense, treatment and therapist effects are
confounded. What is being evaluated is the treatment “package” (Elkin, Parloff, Hadley,
& Autry, 1985), i.e., both the treatment approach as well as the types of therapists that
prefer one treatment orientation. Similar problems have been discussed in medicine, for
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Figure 3.1: An example of a three-level hierarchy where therapists are nested within
treatments.
example, when surgeons are nested within treatments. Devereaux et al. (2005) called
this an expertise-based trial. Moreover, it is also possible that therapist effects vary
between treatments, which could be caused by some treatments being harder to learn,
or that less standardized treatments increase the variance between therapists.
3.4 Nested Versus Crossed
If therapists deliver both of the two treatments being compared, then it is possible to
disentangle some of the therapist effects from the treatment effects (Walwyn & Roberts,
2010; Wampold & Serlin, 2000). If therapists only deliver one of the treatments, we have
a nested design, as shown in Figure 3.1. If therapists deliver both treatments, we have a
crossed design. Both designs have their problems and merits. In a nested design, it is
not possible to rule out selection bias, therapists nested in Treatment A might overall be
more skilled, thus confounding the treatment effect. It also not possible to separate the
main effect of therapists, from the possible therapist× treatment-interaction (Schielzeth
& Nakagawa, 2013). Besides making it harder to interpret the therapist effects, this
also leads to a loss of power compared to the crossed design (de Jong, Moerbeek, &
van der Leeden, 2010). However, in a crossed design, it gets increasingly hard to train
therapists in two different therapies simultaneously, and the risk of contamination is
evident (Chambless & Hollon, 2012). It is also unlikely that therapists can carry out
both treatments with equal skill and commitment, thus making the nested design
more realistic in psychotherapy research (Falkenström, Markowitz, Jonker, Philips, &
Holmqvist, 2013; Wampold & Serlin, 2000).
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3.5 Issues Related to Testing if the Therapist Variance is Exactly
Zero
Most studies in clinical psychology are severely underpowered to detect therapist
variance. Moreover, testing the statistical hypothesis that the therapist variance is
exactly zero, is problematic since we are testing a parameter on the boundary of the
sample space. Self & Liang (1987) called this nonstandard testing, and the consequences
of testing parameters on the boundary were explored more fully by Stram & Lee (1994),
and Stern & Welsh (2000). In short, the standard likelihood ratio test breaks down,
making the test too conservative, and thus, it approximately doubles the type II error
rate. Concerns regarding type II errors have led some psychologists to proposed a
two-step analysis using liberal α-levels of 0.2 to 0.3 (Crits-christoph & Mintz, 1991;
Kirk, 2013). However, failing to reject the null hypothesis of no therapist variance does
not show support for the parameter being zero. This is a common misunderstanding
of significance testing (Nickerson, 2000). The general consensus is that therapists are
part of the study design and that the statistical analysis should be congenial with the
study design, i.e., clustering should be accounted for even when it is “non-significant”
(Baldwin et al., 2011; Roberts & Roberts, 2005).
3.6 Random or Fixed Effects?
Many authors have discussed whether therapists should be viewed as a random or
fixed effect (Crits-Christoph, Tu, & Gallop, 2003; Siemer & Joormann, 2003; Wampold &
Serlin, 2000). The discussion has mainly revolved around generalizability; fixed effects
concerns the therapists in the study, whereas random effects treat the therapists as a
sample from a larger population. Proponents of fixed effects often refer to the fact that
therapists seldom are a random sample from a larger population (Siemer & Joormann,
2003). Whereas authors arguing for treating therapists as a random factor, point out
that we want to make inference about a broader population (Crits-Christoph et al.,
2003). This view has been criticized, by the argument that generalizing to a broader
population should be based on external validity, and not on a specific statistical model
(Kahan & Morris, 2013). It has also been argued that “random sampling” is of marginal
importance, “as a (large) number of draws from any cross-sectionwill most likely appear
random” (Dieleman & Templin, 2014, p. 4). It should be noted, that under the fixed
effects model, statistical inference is made conditional on the included therapists not
changing. Which means that from a frequentist perspective, the hypothetical “repeated
sampling” would be performed with identical therapists. Whereas, under the random
effects model, repeated sampling involves sampling new therapists from the estimated
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distribution of therapists. Thus, the assumed data-generating process (DGP) and the
inference is substantially different.
Furthermore, AndrewGellman called the terms “fixed” and “random” effects ill-defined
(Gelman, 2005), and prefers to use the term varying instead of random (Gelman & Hill,
2006). In the context of multilevel analysis, Gelman instead differentiates between,
complete pooling, no pooling, and partial pooling. Complete pooling ignores all
therapist clustering, thus explicitly assuming that all therapists have precisely the same
overall success. No pooling corresponds to a fixed effects analysis, which assumes that
therapists differ overall in their outcomes and that the outcome from one therapist tells
us absolutely nothing about another therapist, i.e., no information is shared between
clusters. Partial pooling, which is what standard multilevel/linear mixed-effects
models do, assumes that therapists have different outcomes, but that we can share
some information between therapists. Partial pooling “borrows information” across
therapists, by shrinking estimates closer to the overall mean.
3.7 Therapist Effects and Longitudinal Analyses
Despite the vast number of articles published regarding therapist effects, few have
focused on therapist effects in longitudinal designs. Moreover, the ICC, design effect,
and power function gets more complicated when therapists are allowed to have varying
slopes over time and generally depends on several nuisance parameters (Hedeker
& Gibbons, 2006). Thus, recommendations from methodological texts based on
cross-sectional data do not necessarily hold. Although, de Jong et al. (2010) considered
power for a three-level model with therapists, patients, and repeated measures, they
only briefly focused on random slopes at the therapist level. More importantly, they did
not investigate the consequences of ignoring therapist effects.
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Chapter 4
Gambling Disorder and Semicontinuous Data
“If the gambling establishment cannot persuade a patron to turn over money with no
return, it may achieve the same effect by returning part of the patron’s money on a
variable-ratio schedule.”
– B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (1953)
The methodological issues investigated in this thesis are applied to two studies on
gambling disorder. In one study, we investigate the agreement between a collateral
and the person that gambles on the amount of gambling losses, and in the other we
perform an RCT to evaluate an internet-delivered support program for the concerned
significant others of problem gamblers. Following is an overview of both gambling
disorder and interventions aimed at CSOs, which is followed by an introduction to the
problem of analyzing gambling expenditures as a treatment outcome; a problem dealt
with in Study II and Study III.
4.1 Gambling Disorder
Gambling disorder is generally categorized into problem gambling and pathological
gambling. While pathological gambling is defined in both DSM-5 and ICD-11, problem
gambling is a broader term used to describe a less severe form of gambling problems.
Problem gambling is characterized by the inability to control time spent and money
wagered on gambling, despite having a negative impact on the gambler’s economy,
emotional well-being, and social relations. Problem gambling is often associated with
trying to win back money lost on gambling, using gambling to cope with depressive
feelings, having to loan money to pay expenses or to gamble more, or lying about the
time and money spent on gambling (Hodgins, Stea, & Grant, 2011; Petry &Weiss, 2009).
32
About 2% of the Swedish population between 16 and 85 years of age experience
problems caused by gambling (Abbott, Romild, & Volberg, 2018). Prevalence estimates
for gambling problems vary across countries, from 0.2% in Norway to 5.3% in Hong
Kong (Hodgins et al., 2011). This is generally attributed to differences in accessibility
and availability of gambling, but also to differences in survey methods such as screening
techniques, timeframe, administration, and response rates (Hodgins et al., 2011).
However, results from different prevalence studies indicate that gambling problems in
Sweden seems to be relatively stable across time (Abbott et al., 2018; Volberg, Abbott,
Rönnberg, & Munck, 2001). Gambling problems are unevenly distributed in Sweden,
with a higher prevalence among men, people born outside of Sweden, people with a
low eduction, and people 18 to 24 years old (Abbott, Romild, & Volberg, 2014).
Problem gambling is associated with psychological distress (Barry, Stefanovics, Desai,
& Potenza, 2011). Psychiatric comorbidity is common, especially substance-related
disorder, as well as anxiety and affective disorders (Håkansson, Karlsson, &Widinghoff,
2018; Håkansson, Mårdhed, & Zaar, 2017; Williams, Volberg, & Stevens, 2012).
Furthermore, suicide attempts and suicide mortality are more common among people
with gambling problems (Karlsson & Håkansson, 2018; Newman & Thompson, 2007).
Psychological interventions, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy is the most
well-supported treatment for problem gambling (Cowlishaw et al., 2012). However,
evaluating gambling treatments is challenging. Many studies of gambling treatments
are faced with a substantial relapse rate (Echeburúa, Fernández-Montalvo, & Báez,
2001), and high attrition rates (Westphal, 2007), severely affecting what conclusions
are possible to draw. Moreover, there seems to be large non-specific effects associated
with just deciding to seek treatment. Placebo, or non-specific response to gambling
treatment, has been discussed by several authors (Carlbring, Jonsson, Josephson, &
Forsberg, 2010; Toneatto & Ladoceur, 2003; Westphal, 2008). Some empirical evidence
for non-specific effects exists in the literature. For instance, it has been found that
problem gamblers respond to very minimal interventions, such as reading a 30-page
booklet on CBT, receiving one session of motivational interviewing, receiving just a
clinical interview or even being put on a waiting list (Diskin & Hodgins, 2009; Hodgins,
Currie, & el-Guebaly, 2001; Petry, Weinstock, Ledgerwood, & Morasco, 2008). These
non-specific effects, combinedwith high attrition rates, make it hard to draw conclusions
about the long-term effects of gambling treatments.
4.1.1 Concerned Significant Others
Gambling can not only be devastating for the gambler, it can also have serious negative
effects on the lives of the concerned significant others (CSOs; Langham et al., 2016). A
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large portion (18%) of the adult Swedish population sees themselves as CSOs of problem
gamblers (Svensson, Romild, & Shepherdson, 2013). CSOs of problem gamblers tend to
report worse physical and psychological health, and that the relationship to the gambler
is harmed (Kalischuk, Nowatzki, Cardwell, Klein, & Solowoniuk, 2006; Volberg et al.,
2001). In a representative sample in Norway, Wenzel, Øren, & Bakken (2008) found
that 63% of the CSOs reported that the gambler had worsened the family’s financial
situation, and 65% reported that the gambling had led to conflicts in the family. Many
CSOs report that they are often left feeling isolated andunsupported (Krishnan&Orford,
2002). However, CSOs of gamblers can play an essential role in recovery. For instance,
as many as 50% of problem gamblers report that they rely on informal help provided by
their CSO (Clarke, Abbott, DeSouza, & Bellringer, 2007), and gamblers report concerns
for CSOs as an important reason for entering treatment (Bertrand, Dufour, Wright, &
Lasnier, 2008).
There is evidence that shame and stigma are the main barriers for CSOs in seeking help
(Hing, Tiyce, Holdsworth, & Nuske, 2013; Valentine & Hughes, 2010), and that CSOs
typically turn to self-help, online or telephone support before seeking professional help
(Hing et al., 2013). Thus, it is possible that an internet-delivered treatment could seem
attractive to CSOs.
Despite the long list of gambling-related negative consequences that CSOs suffer,
support for CSOs has been limited (Hodgins, Toneatto, Makarchuk, Skinner, & Vincent,
2007). A mere handful of studies have evaluated interventions for CSOs of problem
gamblers. The types of interventions available for CSOs of addicts can broadly be
categorized into three categories: 1) working with the CSO to motivate the addict to
enter treatment, 2) involving a CSO in the treatment of the addict, and 3) working with
the CSO’s needs in their own right (Copello, Velleman, & Templeton, 2005).
4.1.2 CSOs and Problem Gamblers’ Motivation to Seek Treatment
Only about 5% of the problem gamblers seek professional help (Cunningham, 2005;
Statens folkhälsoinstitut, 2010). Numerous researchers have suggested that CSOs can
play a crucial role in getting the gambler to enter treatment, and they have highlighted
the need to equip CSOs better to handle the problem gambling (Clarke et al., 2007;
Dickson-Swift, James, & Kippen, 2005; Gomes & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Ingle, Marotta,
McMillan, & Wisdom, 2008; Petry & Weiss, 2009). Even though financial concerns are
often the main reason that gamblers seek help (Bellringer, Pulford, Abbott, DeSouza,
& Clarke, 2008), many gamblers report concerns for CSOs as an important reason for
entering treatment (Hing et al., 2013; Hodgins & el-Guebaly, 2000).
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4.1.3 Community Reinforcement and Family Training
Research on training-programs aimed at CSOs of substance misusers has shown
promising results in getting treatment-refusing substance misusers into treatment. The
approach with the most substantial empirical support is community reinforcement and
family training (CRAFT; Copello et al., 2005; Fernandez, Begley, & Marlatt, 2006; Meis et
al., 2013). The CRAFT-model is based on cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT)-principles
and has three main goals: 1) motivate to the substance misuser to seek treatment, 2)
decrease the substance misuse, and 3) increase the CSOs quality of life. A meta-analysis
of CRAFT-studies found that, overall, 66% of the CSOs managed to get their loved
ones to enter treatment (Roozen, Waart, & Kroft, 2010), whereas the corresponding
numbers were 18% for Al/Nar-anon and 30% for Johnson Intervention. Also, CRAFT
was found to improve CSO functioning in terms of depression, anger, family conflicts,
and relationship happiness.
The CRAFT-model is founded on principles from CBT, especially operant conditioning.
The CRAFT-method employs six overall concepts: 1) functional analysis of the substance
misuse, 2) communication training, 3) positive reinforcement of sober behavior, 4) the
use of natural negative consequences, 5) helping the CSO enrich their own lives, and 6)
teaching the CSO when and how to invite the substance misuser to enter treatment.
4.1.4 CRAFT and Problem Gambling
The CRAFT approach has been modified and tested with CSOs of problem gamblers
in three studies. Makarchuk, Hodgins, & Peden (2002) first evaluated CRAFT for
gambling in a pilot RCT, where a 45-page self-help manual was developed and
evaluated. The study compared a group that received the CRAFT-manual to a
control condition that received a standard information packet. Both groups displayed
significant improvements, but there was no difference in treatment engagement.
However, the CRAFT-group reported a greater reduction in gambling, a greater
amount of satisfaction with the program, and having their needs met to a larger extent
than the control condition. The same research group proceeded with evaluating the
CRAFT-program in a larger RCT (n = 186; Hodgins et al., 2007). In this study, they
added a CRAFT-condition that received minimal telephone support (1 to 2 calls).
Unfortunately, the second study yielded essentially the same results as the pilot
study—i.e., inconclusive results regarding any difference in treatment entry between
the groups, but a significant difference in favor of CRAFT on days gambling, CSOs’
program satisfaction and experiences of having their needs met. The authors concluded
that the approach was promising, but that it is likely that CSOs are in need of additional
support in order to successfully implement the CRAFT-techniques. Nayoski & Hodgins
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(2016), therefore, tested the CRAFT approach in a small study (n = 32), where they
compared a face-to-face treatment to a workbook-only group. No conclusive results
where found, but effect sizes were in the same direction as previous studies. CSOs in
the individual treatment reported greater functioning, and that their gambler spent less
money and time on gambling compared to the workbook-only group.
4.1.5 Working with the CSOs in Their Own Right
Few studies have evaluated interventions that focus on working with CSOs of problem
gamblers in their own right. My review of the literature only identified one such study.
Rychtarik & McGillicuddy (2006) performed a preliminary evaluation of a coping skills
training (CST) program for CSOs of pathological gamblers. They found a large reduction
in depression and anxiety in the CST-group relative to a wait-list control. However,
they could draw no conclusions regarding differences between the groups on partner
gambling or treatment entry.
4.2 Semicontinuous Gambling Data
“All models are wrong but some are useful.”
– George E. P. Box, 1979
An important aim of gambling treatments is to reduce gambling losses and help
prevent relapses. In a consensus statement regarding the reporting of outcomes from
problem gambling trials, it was proposed that measures of gambling behavior should
focus on net expenditure and days gambled (Walker et al., 2006). In the published
literature, these outcomes are often analyzed as if they were normally distributed, or
by log transforming the outcome. Net expenditure on gambling is typically heavily
skewed with some participants losing much more money than the rest. Adding further
complexity, many participants stop gambling or gamble on very few days when they
enter a treatment trial, resulting in data with a lot of zeros (no expenditure). Data on
the daily losses on gambling, or the daily number of drinks has typically been collected
by retrospective reports, such as the timeline follow-back (TLFB) method. However, the
internet and smartphones have made electronic collection much more feasible. More
intensive data collection methods, such as diary methods, or ecological momentary
assessment, are gaining in popularity. Moreover, gambling research might be unique in
the possibilities offered by behavioral tracking of online gambling. By collaboratingwith
gambling operators, researchers get access to ecologically valid data on a transactional
level. These research opportunities will likely increase; for instance, an increasing
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amount of gambling in Sweden is performed online (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2019).
Behavioral tracking is also increasing; all gambling on Svenska spel’s land-based and
online products are tracked. There will be a need to evaluate the responsible gambling
tools offered by the operators, and the data generated will require sophisticated
statistical methods to gain insight into the gambling behavior of the consumers.
4.2.1 Similar Problems in Other Research Fields
Other addiction sub-fields face similar issues. Studies that collect drinks per day
or cigarettes per day also include a lot of zeros (Atkins, Baldwin, Zheng, Gallop, &
Neighbors, 2013; Bandyopadhyay, DeSantis, Korte, & Brady, 2011). To analyze these
data methodologists have mostly proposed different count models, most commonly
zero-inflated or hurdle models. Both zero-inflated and hurdle models split the model
into two parts: a Bernoulli part for modeling abstinence, and a count distribution
(e.g., Poisson or negative binomial) for the number of drinks on drinking days. In the
case of hurdle models, the count process is truncated at zero, whereas zero-inflated
models allow both parts of the model to contribute zeros. The two types of zeros in
a zero-inflated model are often called “structural” and “sampling” zeros (He, Tang,
Wang, & Crits-Christoph, 2014). In addiction research, individuals that are not at
risk of using, e.g., non-smokers, are viewed as structural zeros, whereas smokers that
happened to not smoke during the sampling period are sampling zeros, i.e., they are
at risk but did not smoke. In a hurdle model, only the Bernoulli part contribute zeros,
so all individuals are conceptualized as being at-risk; thus, zeros are sampling zeros.
Hurdle models are also described by a two-step decision process, where individuals
first decide if they should drink or not, and once this “hurdle” is crossed a user then
decides on how much to drink. Participants in clinical trials are often defined as at-risk
simply due to the study’s inclusion criteria, and the hurdle model is often preferred.
However, a zero-inflated model might still be useful if there are reasons to suspect two
distinct processes that generate zero-observations.
DeSantis et al. (2013) found that a hurdle-Poisson model worked well to evaluate
treatment effects from high-resolution drinking data. They also found that placing the
hurdle at a “low-risk”-cutoff of 4 to 5 for the number of drinks per day, fit the data better
than a hurdle at zero. Xing et al. (2015) proposed a two-part Bayesian random-effects
model with a skewed distribution to model dependency symptoms data. Atkins et
al. (2013) proposed the hurdle Poisson model for count drinking data in treatment
research, and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) also found that a hurdle binomial model best
fit their data. However, these are mostly count models, and their findings are unlikely
to generalize to net losses from gambling.
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Continuous dependent variables with excess zeros have a long history in the
econometrical literature. Similar to the countmodels described earlier, the data-generating
process is characterized by a two-part economic decision process. One process governs
participation (binary part), and another governs the amount of money to spend
(continuous part). For instance, studies on health service use typically contain a
non-trivial proportion of individuals that did not use health services, and thus did not
have any health expenditure during the study period. In these settings, commonly used
models are the Tobit, Heckman sample selection model, and two-part model (Basu &
Manning, 2009; Mihaylova, Briggs, O’Hagan, & Thompson, 2011). The main difference
between the models is the assumption about how zeros arise (Neelon, O’Malley, &
Smith, 2016). In the Tobit model, zeros are censored normal observations, and predictors
are assumed to have the same influence on the decision to participate and the intensity.
Whereas, both Heckman and two-part models separate the decision to participate
from how much to spend (Wooldridge, 2010). Conceptually, zeros in the Heckman
model represents censored positive values, that could have been observed under ideal
circumstances, whereas the two-part model treats zeros as actual zero expenditures.
Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse (1983) noted that when zeros represent actual
zero expenditure, two-part models are easier to interpret. Moreover, two-part models
are more numerically stable (Min & Agresti, 2002). Selection models can be used to
model actual outcomes, but are typically used when zeros represent missing values,
hence the name sample selection models (Madden, 2008). Additionally, as an alternative
to two-part models, Deb & Trivedi (2002) proposed finite-mixture models, to capture
e.g., “frequent” and “infrequent” use.
These models have been discussed in gambling research, mostly related to lottery
participation, e.g., Humphreys, Lee, & Soebbing (2010) used them to study consumer
behavior in lotteries and found that the hurdle model best fit their data. Similar
results were found by Rude, Surry, & Kron (2014), who studied Swedish gambling
expenditure, and Jaunky & Ramchurn (2014) when modeling consumer behaviors on
scratch cardmarkets. Economicmodels of gambling expenditure havemostly used Tobit
or two-part models (Abdel‐Ghany & Sharpe, 2001; Crowley, Eakins, & Jordan, 2012;
Farrell & Walker, 1999; Sawkins & Dickie, 2002), possibly favoring two-part models. For
instance, Stranahan & Borg (1998) made the point that the decision to gamble should be
statistically separated from the decision on how much to spend gambling. However,
all these are cross-sectional models applied to non-clinical data, mostly applied to
population expenditure and participation in lotteries or scratch cards.
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4.2.2 Longitudinal Extensions
Two-part models have been extended to longitudinal analyses by incorporating random
effects into each part (Olsen & Schafer, 2001; Tooze, Grunwald, & Jones, 2002). In clinical
research, it is highly likely that the twoparts of themodel are correlated, e.g., it is possible
that individuals that are more likely to participate in gambling, also are likely to gamble
for more money. With longitudinal data it is also possible to have correlated random
slopes between the two parts of the model, meaning that change in the probability of
participation over time, is correlated with the change in expenditure over time. Tooze
et al. (2002) described how this could be achieved by letting the two parts of the model
be correlated via their random effects. Independence between the two parts are often
assumed due to computational reasons; however, Su, Tom, & Farewell (2009) have shown
that ignoring the correlation will bias the results.
4.2.3 Appropriate Treatment Effect Estimands
An issue with two-part models is that they lead to two treatment effects, one for each
part of the model—one effect on reporting a zero, and one effect on the impact of the
treatment on the non-zero values. It is possible to average over the two parts to get
a “marginal” treatment effect; however, due to the nonlinear transformations, this
marginal effect will be heterogeneous over the random effects (Smith, Neelon, Preisser,
& Maciejewski, 2015). This property of two-part random effects models seems to have
been largely overlooked in the addiction treatment studies that use them. However,
instead of modeling expenditure conditional on it being non-zero, it is possible to
directly model the overall expenditure in the continuous part of the model, by solving
for the marginal mean (Smith et al., 2015). These marginalized two-part random effects
models will lead to treatment effects on the overall expenditure that are homogenous
over the random effects. Yet, as noted by Zhang, Liu, & Hu (2018), these models are not
truly marginal models, in the sense that they estimate population-average estimates,
but instead estimate treatment effects that are conditional on subject-specific random
effects (Diggle et al., 2002). However, this conditional property of the model applies
to all (generalized) linear mixed-effects models, and it is not necessarily something
negative. Choosing between population-average or subject-specific effects depends on
the research question. However, subject-specific models are probably most useful for
clinical research, and population-average in public health research (Fitzmaurice, Laird,
& Ware, 2012).
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Chapter 5
Aims
The aim of this thesis was to explore methodological challenges that impact the
evaluation of psychological treatments in general but also gambling treatment trials
specifically. The first two studies discuss important methodological issues that
researchers tend to overlook, and the issues are investigated empirically using Monte
Carlo methods. The results from Study I and II are then applied to answer the
clinical research questions in Study III and IV. Specifically, Study I investigates the
consequences of ignoring therapist effects in longitudinal data. Study II investigates
the challenges of estimating treatment effects in gambling studies using gambling
expenditure as an outcome. Study III applies and extends the work in Study II to
investigate how concordant gamblers and their concerned significant others are in their
reports of gambling losses. Study IV applies the results from Study I, II, and III to
investigate the effects of an internet-delivered program aimed at the CSOs of treatment
refusing gamblers.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Studies
6.1 Details on the Methods Used
Before covering the individual studies in this thesis, I will first provide some further
elaborations on the key methods used in these studies.
6.1.1 Monte Carlo Simulation Studies
Paper I and II use computer simulations to run experiments in order to evaluate
statistical methods empirically. In short, a Monte Carlo study is performed by coding
the DGP and drawing samples from it using a pseudo-random number generator. This
creates simulated data sets from a known process. We can then use this to evaluate
the performance of statistical methods, both the performance of a correct model and
a misspecified model that deviates from the true DGP in some important way. For
instance, if we generate 5000 data sets and fit a model to each data set, then we can
check how many of the 5000 95% confidence intervals that include the true value. If the
confidence intervals are valid, 95% (± Monte Carlo error) of them should include the
true value. Monte Carlo studies are empirical experiments, and substantive knowledge
is needed to design useful simulation experiments (Burton, Altman, Royston, & Holder,
2006; Morris, White, & Crowther, 2019).
6.1.2 Power Analysis
Sample size planning for two- and three-level LMMs is challenging, in anything but
trivial models, multiple interacting factors impact power. For psychotherapy studies,
the therapist level is a complicating factor since most studies only include very few
therapists. For these designs, power is significantly impacted by the number of
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therapists. Moreover, when the study design is partially nested or when the number of
subjects per therapist varies, the correct degrees of freedom must be approximated. In
this section, I will give some concrete examples of the challenges as applied to Study
IV. When the trial was planned power was based on a two-level random intercept
and slopes model, and I partly developed the R package powerlmm to solve some of
the challenges related to incorporating therapist effects and missing data in the power
analysis.
The three-level partially nested model can be written as,
Control group:
Level 1
Yij = β0j + β1jtij + Rij
Level 2
β0j = δ000 + U0j
β1j = δ100 + U1j
Treatment group:
Level 1
Yijk = β0jk + β1jktijk + Rijk
Level 2
β0jk = γ00k + U0jk
β1jk = γ10k + U1jk
Level 3
γ00k = δ000 + δ001 + V0k
γ10k = δ100 + δ101 + V1k
(6.1)
Where δ101 gives the difference in change over time between the treatment and the
control group. In addition, the patient-specific and therapist-specific random effects
follow multivariate normal distributions,U0jk
U1jk
 ∼ N
 0
0
,
σ2u0 σu01
σu01 σ2u1
 , (6.2)
and, V0k
V1k
 ∼ N
 0
0
,
σ2v0 σv01
σv01 σ2v1
 , (6.3)
and the within-patient residuals are, Rijk ∼ N (0, σ2e ).
Power will depend greatly on the relative size of the variance components. Two
important ratios are the “variance ratio”, (σ2u1 + σ2v1)/σ2e , as well as the amount of
variance in change over time attributed to the therapist level (the “therapist effect”),
σ2v1/(σ2u1+σ2v1). The technical details of the calculations are covered inMagnusson (2018),
and in powerlmm’s vignettes. Figure 6.1 shows the power curves for both the achieved
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Figure 6.1: Power as a function of the variance ratio for different effect sizes and amounts
of dropout (proportion of dropout at the last time point). The calculations are based on
the realized sample size (100 participants, unbalanced allocation to therapists) and 7 time
points. The dashed curved shows powerwhen 5% of the slope variance is at the therapist
level.
and planned for sample size in Study IV. We see that with the achieved sample size the
statistical test will have rather low sensitivity assuming that the true effect would be d =
0.5, unless the random slope variance is small compared to the within-subject residual
variance.
As there is a possibly large difference in power under the assumption of a two-level or
three-level model, one might be tempted to use a likelihood ratio test (LRT) to rule out
any therapist effects. Figure 6.2 shows that the likelihood ratio test does not automatically
keep the type I error at correct levels.1 There is always a balance between type I errors
and power, as the LRT α is increased both power and type I errors moves towards the
three-level model that always accounts for therapist effects. Moreover, the comparison
is skewed towards the two-level model since we are effectively accepting a larger α level.
The difference is even less pronounced if we set α = 0.075 for the three-level model.
If investigators are willing the increase the risk of committing a type I error in order
to reduce the risk of a type II error, then the more principled way of achieving this
would be to increase α together with using a three-level model. The problemwith using
the two-level model is that the actual α level depends on unknown factors, such as the
between-therapist variance in change over time. The problemwith the three-level model
is that power depends a lot on the number of therapists. Thus, from a planning point of
view, it might be hard to design studies with a reasonable chance of detecting clinically
relevant effects. Figure 6.3 shows that just adding more participants does very little to
increase power; the number of therapists will have a much larger impact on power than
the total number of subjects.
1This example is adapted from one of my blog posts: https://rpsychologist.com/
do-you-need-multilevel-powerlmm-0-4-0
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Figure 6.2: The impact of using LRT model selection to decide if therapist effects should
be accounted for. Impact of the LRT’s α-level is shown on both the type I errors and
power.
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Figure 6.3: The impact of the number of therapists on power as a function of the total
sample size. The curve labeledNo therapist effect showspower assuming a two-levelmodel
with no therapist-level random slope variance.
Generally, both dropout and the number of subjects per therapist will be unknown, and
we must use some approximation to decide how sensitive we want our test to be given a
reasonable level of therapist imbalance and missing data.
6.1.3 Missing Data Considerations
Psychological treatments are delivered over repeated sessions, and patients are
generally followed-up for 6 to 12 months after treatment completion—making missing
data practically unavoidable. This is probably the main reason for the popularity of
longitudinal data analysis via linear mixed-effects models in clinical psychology.
Rubin (1976) presented three types of missing data mechanisms: missing completely at
random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), missing not at random (MNAR). LMMs
provide unbiased estimates under MAR missingness; however, it is not entirely clear
44
Wait−list Treatment
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
−2 0 2
Slope (Z value)
P
(d
ro
po
ut
)
Figure 6.4: A differential MNAR dropout process where the probability of dropping
out from a trial depends on the patient-specific slopes which interact with the treatment
allocation. The probability of dropout is assumed to be constant over time.
that assuming MAR is completely justified. I will, therefore, present a simple example
of when the LMM fails and illustrate some of the sensitivity analyses used in Study IV.
Simplified, ifwe have the complete outcomevariableY (which ismadeupof the observed
data Yobs and the missing values Ymiss) and a missing data indicator R (Little & Rubin,
2014; Rubin, 1976; Schafer & Graham, 2002), then we can write the MCAR and MAR
mechanisms as,
MCAR : P(R | Y) = P(R)
MAR : P(R | Y) = P(R | Yobs).
(6.4)
If the missingness depends on Ymiss, the missing values in Y, then the mechanism is
MNAR. MCAR and MAR are called ignorable because the precise model describing
the missing data process is not needed. In theory, valid inference under MNAR
missingness requires specifying a joint distribution for both the data and themissingness
mechanisms (Little, 1995). There are no ways to test if the missing data are MAR or
MNAR (Molenberghs, Beunckens, Sotto, & Kenward, 2008; Rhoads, 2012), and it
is therefore recommended to perform sensitivity analyses using different MNAR
mechanisms (Hedeker & Gibbons, 1997; Little, 1995; Schafer & Graham, 2002).
6.1.3.1 An Empirical Example of MAR vs. MNAR Missing Data
LMMs are frequently used by researchers to deal with missing data problems in
psychotherapy trials. However, in my opinion, researchers frequently misunderstand
the MAR assumption and fail to build a model that would make the assumption more
plausible. Sometimes you even see researchers using tests, e.g., Little’s MCAR test, to
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Figure 6.5: A sample of patients drawn from the MNAR (random slope) data-generating
process. Circles represent complete observations; the bold line represents the slope
before dropping out. P(dropout) gives the probability of dropout, which is assumed
to be constant at all time points.
prove that the missing data mechanisms is either MCAR or MAR and hence ignorable.
Naturally, as stated earlier, such a conclusion is a clear misunderstanding and builds on
faulty logic.
Another common misunderstanding is that LMMs yield unbiased estimates if the
dropout is related to the patient-specific slopes (i.e., the random effects). Clearly,
it would be practical if the inclusion of random slopes would allow missingness to
depend on patients’ latent change over time. Unfortunately, the random effects are
latent variables and not observed—hence, such a missingness mechanism would
also be MNAR (Little, 1995). Figure 6.6 illustrates the MAR, outcome-based MNAR,
and random coeﬀicient-based MNAR mechanisms. In my experience, psychotherapy
researchers tend to include quite few prognostic covariates in their models, or variables
that are thought to be related to the missingness. Thus, most LMMs (that are used to
deal with missing data) make the assumption that missingness only depends on the
previously observed values of the outcome. This is quite a strong assumption.
To illustrate these concepts I generated data from a two-level LMM with random
intercept and slopes, and included a MNAR missing data mechanism where the
likelihood of dropping out depended on the patient-specific random slopes. Moreover,
the missingess differed between the treatment and control group. Figure 6.4 and 6.5
illustrate the dropout mechanism, which are based on the following equations,
logit(Pr(Rij = 1|TXij = 1)) = −σu1 + logit(0.15) + U1j
logit(Pr(Rij = 1|TXij = 0)) = −σu1 + logit(0.15)− U1j.
(6.5)
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Table 6.1: Results from the simulation with a random slope MNAR dropout process.
Model Est. Rel. bias (%) d Power CI coverage Type I error
LMM (MAR) -11.84 274 -0.74 1.00 0.02 0.83
GEE -11.19 254 -0.70 1.00 0.06 0.71
LMM (PM) -5.39 70 -0.34 0.64 0.84 0.10
JM -3.18 0.6 -0.20 0.28 0.93 0.07
LMM (complete) -3.21 1.4 -0.20 0.38 0.95 0.05
Note. MAR = missing at random; LMM = linear mixed-effects model; GEE = generalized
estimating equation; JM = joint model; PM = pattern mixture; Est. = mean of the estimated
effects; Rel. bias = relative bias of Est.; d = mean of the Cohen’s d estimates.
To show the consequences of this random-slope dependent MNAR scenario under
different models, I performed a small simulation. The study had 11 time points, 150
participants per group, the variance ratio was 0.02, the pretest ICC was 0.6, with a
correlation between intercept and slopes of -0.5, and there was a small effect in favor of
the treatment of d = −0.2. Five different models was compared:
• LMM (MAR): a classical LMM assuming that the dropout was MAR.
• GEE: a generalized estimating equation model.
• LMM (PM): an LMM using a pattern-mixture approach. Two patterns were used;
either “dropout” or “completer”, and the results were averaged over the two
patterns.
• JM: A joint model that correctly allowed the dropout to be related to the random
slopes.
• LMM with complete data: an LMM fit to the complete data without any
missingness.
Table 6.1 shows the results, and Figure 6.7 shows how much the treatment effects differ.
We can see that LMMs are badly biased under this missing data scenario; the treatment
effect is much larger then it should be (Cohen’s d: -0.7 vs. -0.2). The pattern-mixture
approach improves the situation, and the joint model recovers the true effect. Since the
sample size is large, the bias under the MAR assumption leads to the LMM’s CIs having
extremely bad coverage. Moreover, under the assumption of no treatment effect theMAR
LMM’s type I errors are very high (83%), whereas the pattern-mixture and joint model
are closer to the nominal levels.
This simulation example is purposely quite extreme. However, even if the MNAR
mechanism would be weaker, the LMM will yield biased estimates of the treatment
effect. The assumption that dropout might be related to patients’ unobserved slopes
is not unreasonable. However, fitting a joint model is often not feasible as we do not
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know the true missingness mechanism. I included it just to illustrate what is required to
avoid bias under a MNAR mechanism. In reality, the patients’ likelihood of dropping
out is likely an inseparable mix of various degrees of MCAR, MAR, and MNAR
mechanisms. The only sure way of avoiding bias would be to try to acquire data from
all participants—and when that fails, perform sensitivity analyses using reasonable
assumptions of the missingness mechanisms.
6.2 Study I: “The Consequences of Ignoring Therapist Effects in
Longitudinal Data”
In Study I, we investigated the consequences of ignoring therapist effects in longitudinal
data analysis. We also performed a small review of all the trials published in the Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology from 2008 to 2018, which showed that virtually
no investigators accounted for the possibility that therapists might differ in their
effectiveness.
We present what factors influence type I errors when ignoring therapist effects and also
report the results from a large simulation study.
6.2.1 Methods
We first analytically derived what factors would impact the Type I errors when ignoring
therapist effects, which were: the number of time points, the number of subjects per
therapist, the amount of heterogeneity in change over time, and the amount of the total
slope-variance at the therapist level. We then carried out a factorial experiment where
these factors were manipulated, and in addition, we also manipulated the amount of
imbalance in the number of subjects per therapist, compared full versus partial nesting
and the impact of missing data. In total, there were 1,584 different conditions evaluated.
6.2.2 Results
The empirical simulation results validated the analytical results, and showed that
even when 5% of the variance in slopes is at the therapist level, the type I errors can
be substantially inflated. The simulations also revealed that unbalanced allocation of
patients to the therapists can have a large impact of the type I errors, when the therapist
level is ignored.
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6.2.3 Conclusions
Potential therapist effects can have a substantial impact on the type I errors and yield
highly unreliable results. When analyzing data from longitudinal studies, investigators
should account for the possibility that therapists might have different overall slopes over
time. In an LMM, this can be accounted for by including a random slope at the therapist
level.
6.3 Study II: “Modeling Longitudinal Gambling Data: Challenges
and Opportunities”
Gambling expenditure is a common outcome in gambling research, and it is
recommended as a treatment outcome in the Banff consensus statement (Walker
et al., 2006). However, analyzing gambling expenditure poses many challenges. Not
only is the outcome highly skewed with some participants losing a small amount of
money and some very large amounts—if the treatment is successful there will also be a
large proportion of reports that are zero.
6.3.1 Methods
We used data from a recent RCT comparing two behavioral interventions aimed at
problem gamblers (Nilsson, Magnusson, Carlbring, Andersson, & Hellner Gumpert,
2016), to highlight the issues and show that our proposedmodel can be a more attractive
option. We also reviewed 69 published articles to understand better how authors tend
to deal with the problem. The review showed that the problem is well recognized and
that researchers try to deal with the problem mostly by log transforming the outcome
(most likely a log(y + 1) transformation when the outcome include zeros), or continue
with a standard analysis based on a normally distributed residuals. Furthermore, we
compared the performance of the proposed two-part model to the typical methods
used by investigators: a linear mixed-effects model with or without a log(y + 1)
transformation. The performance of these models was compared using different Monte
Carlo simulation scenarios. The choice of an appropriate estimand for treatment effects
was also discussed, where we argue that gambling researchers should primarily be
concerned with the overall reduction in gambling losses.
6.3.2 Results
In general, the classical LMM with our without a log(y + 1) transformation were both
biased and substantially less eﬀicient (i.e., had less power) compared to the two-part
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model. The log(y + 1) transformation performed worse when the proportion of zeros
differed between treatment arms—which badly biased the results in some scenarios and
even obscured a large overall reduction in gambling losses.
6.3.3 Conclusions
The marginalized two-part model is an attractive option to model gambling losses as a
treatment outcome. Under the assumptions that gambling losses are semicontinuous,
and that the conditionally positive losses follow a gamma distribution the proposed
two-part model is superior to or equal to the other models as measured by either the
CI’s coverage probabilities, power, bias, and root-mean-square error (RMSE).
6.4 Study III: “Level of Agreement Between Problem Gamblers’
and Collaterals’ Reports”
In Study III, we investigated the level of agreement between problem gamblers and their
CSOs. We also demonstrated the utility of the two-part model when calculating ICCs as
compared to the Gaussian LMM.
6.4.1 Methods
The sample consisted of problem gamblers and their CSOs participating in a trial
comparing individual CBT versus behavioral couples therapy (Nilsson et al., 2016). A
total of 133 dyads were included, and we used their baseline reports of gambling losses
using the timeline followback covering the last 30-days. We used a two-part model with
a dyad-level random intercept and compared both a lognormal and gamma response
distribution. The level of agreement was estimated using the intraclass correlation
coeﬀicient (ICC). We also compared whether the level of agreement differed as a
function of the type of CSO (parent, partner, or other).
6.4.2 Results
Overall there was a fair-level of agreement, ICC = .57, 95% CI [.48, .64]. There were some
evidence that partner CSOs had a higher level of agreement compared to parent CSOs,
ICCdiff = .20, 95% CI [.03, .39].
6.4.3 Conclusions
In this study, we show two things: First, in this type of population, CSOs and problem
gamblers are fairly in agreement regarding the amount of money lost. Second, ICCs
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calculated using the Gaussian LMM are highly unreliable, and the nature of gambling
losses make the normal assumptions highly unlikely to hold. A small simulation study
both validated the two-partmodel, and further showed that theGaussianmodel resulted
in biased ICC estimates under assumptions relevant to our study. Thus, even if the ICCs
are more complicated to calculate using the two-part GLMM, it can be worth the trouble
since its estimates are more precise, less biased, and more informative.
6.5 Study IV: “Internet-delivered Cognitive-behavioral Therapy
for Concerned Significant Others of People with Problem
gambling”
In Study IV, we investigated the eﬀicacy of an Internet-delivered CBT program for CSOs
of treatment refusing problem gamblers. This study use the findings from Study I, II,
and III: 1) we adjusted for therapist effects, 2) used the CSOs reports of their loved one’s
gambling losses 3) and used the two-part model to analyze the longitudinal reports of
gambling losses.
6.5.1 Methods
In total, 100CSOs of treatment-refusing problemgamblerswere randomized to either ten
weeks of ICBT or a waitlist control. The primary analysis assumed a MAR missing data
mechanism; however, we performed sensitivity analyses using both pattern-mixture
methods and multilevel multiple imputation. We tried to estimate the causal effect of
adhering to the intervention by using data on the number of completed worksheets and
the time spent on the online treatment modules.
This trial was prospectively registered with clinicaltrials.gov (NCT02250586), and a
study protocol with a more detailed description of the trials is published open access
(Magnusson, Nilsson, Hellner Gumpert, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2015).
For transparency and for better pooling of data, we also published the raw data,
including all measured outcomes together with the R scripts used to analyze the trial.
The data and scripts can be downloaded from https://osf.io/awtg7.
6.5.2 Results
At posttest the intervention group reported an improvement on the CSO’s emotional
consequences (d = -0.90, 95% CI [-1.47, -0.33]), relationship satisfaction (d = 0.41, 95%
[0.05, 0.76]), anxiety (d = -0.45, 95% [-0.81, -0.09]), depression (d = -0.49, 95% [-0.82,
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-0.16]). Any effects on the CSO’s reports of gambling losses and treatment-seeking were
inconclusive.
6.5.3 Conclusions
Problem gamblers are hard to influence via their CSO proxies; however, the intervention
had a clinically meaningful effect of the CSO’s coping as measured by their emotional
consequences, anxiety, depression, and relationship satisfaction. It also seems like
that there was a dose-response effect, where participants that engaged more with the
intervention benefited more.
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Figure 6.6: Three different drop outmechanisms in longitudinal data fromone patient. a)
Illustrates a MAR mechanism where the patient’s likelihood of dropping out is related
to an observed large value. b) Shows an outcome-related MNAR mechanism, where
dropout is related to a large unobserved value. c) Shows a random-slope MNAR
mechanism where the likelihood of dropping out is related to the patient’s unobserved
slope.
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Figure 6.7: Mean of the estimated treatment effect from the MNAR missing data
simulations for the different models. The dashed lines represents the control group’s
estimated average slope and the solid lines the treatment group’s average slope.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
“Null hypothesis testing of correlational predictions from weak substantive theories in
soft psychology is subject to the influence of ten obfuscating factors whose effects are
usually (1) sizeable, (2) opposed, (3) variable, and (4) unknown. The net epistemic effect
of these ten obfuscating influences is that the usual research literature review is well nigh
uninterpretable. Major changes in graduate education, conduct of research, and editorial
policy are proposed.”
– Paul E. Meehl (1990)
This discussion will start with issues more specifically related to gambling disorder
interventions, and then move on to the broader topics related to psychotherapy research
in general.
7.1 Helping CSOs and Problem Gamblers
Being a CSO of a problem gambler is not an easy situation, and evaluating interventions
aimed towards CSOs is important. However, evaluating such interventions was
challenging, and there are several aspects that deserve further scrutiny.
7.1.1 Choice of Outcome
The primary outcome in the trial was the Inventory of Consequences Scale for the Gambler and
CSO (ICS). It consists of three sub-scales intended to measure: 1) the CSO’s emotional
consequences, 2) the CSO’s behavioral consequences, and 3) consequences for the
gambler. One could rightly ask if this is the most relevant primary outcome and
that, in theory, treatment-entry is more important. However, there are several issues
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with treatment-entry as an outcome as well. First, there is a lack of treatment options
which might lead to an underestimation of the effect of the intervention. Second, just
entering treatment does not mean that the gambling problem has gone away, and
even for patients that finish the treatment, their situation might not improve much.
Thus, using treatment-entry as an outcome could overestimate the actual benefits of
the intervention. Third, the CSOs might benefit even without the gambler entering
treatment; for instance, CSOs might be successful in influencing the problem gambler
to quit or at least reduce the negative consequences caused by gambling, without the
gambler having to enter treatment.
Using a scale such as the ICS to try to capture different dimensions of the gambling harms
is not a bad idea. The problemwith the ICS scale, however, is that it has unclear validity.
We do not know if it captures a change in the consequences caused by problem gambling,
and we do not know how to interpret the scores. Moreover, all items are weighted the
same, but it seems highly unlikely that all consequences are equal and that we should
put more weight on others.
It is also possible that the meaning of some of the items varies for different subgroups
(i.e., lack of measurement invariance). For instance, the items’ meaning might differ
for parents and partners, or for CSOs that live in the same household as the gambler
versus those who live apart. A similar concern is if the intervention actually impacts
how the CSOs perceives the questions. Part of the intervention is psychoeducation about
gambling problems. Hence, it is possible that the relationship between the construct and
the measure change over time due to the CSOs learning more about gambling problems.
This raises the question: does a 10-point difference mean the same at baseline and at
posttest for the treated versus the control participants?
7.1.2 Choice of Comparator
As I discuss in the background, the waitlist control has received much criticism.
However, considering the lack of previous research, the use of a waitlist control in Study
IV can be defended in this trial. Moreover, the person with the problem gambling is
potentially blinded as they need not know about the CSO’s participation in the trial.
As we discuss in the paper, this could lead to a difference in the outcomes related to
the CSO and the gambler. However, it is still true that the comparator does not control
for non-specific effects. The larger effect on the CSO’s emotional well-being might be
entirely caused by the telephone contact and the CSO’s relation to the counselor. For
instance, the measures of adherence could just be a proxy for the amount of time talking
or messaging with the counselor.
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7.1.3 Feasibility
By looking at the usage data of the online program, we can conclude that the uptake
varies substantially. The written feedback indicates that there is a group of CSOs who
find this type of intervention meaningful and who would recommend it. In many ways,
low adherence is understandable. The CSO’s are not the one engaging in the problematic
behavior. Working through a program over ten weeks (partly by themselves) requires a
lot of motivation, probably more than usual compared to, for instance, ICBT for social
phobia or depression. The CSO has to deal with the gambler owing themmoney and not
paying for their shared expenses, in addition, it might be hard to even notice a change
in the gambling behavior if the gambler tries to conceal it. If they also work full-time
and have young children, it is understandable why it might be hard to find the time and
motivation to work on an online program for “someone else’s” problems.
Still, some CSOs did adhere to the program, and the dose-response analysis indicated
a beneficial effect. More research is needed to investigate the causal effect of sticking
with the program. But it is possible that the treatment effect is clinically relevant for
the participants who are motivated and actually adhere to the program. Our clinical
impression during the study was that the group of participants is very heterogeneous,
some were parents to gamblers living in another town, and some were spouses living
with the gambler—two completely different situations.
The choice of outcome questionnaires might have negatively impacted missing data. If
it feels like you are just guessing, it might not seem meaningful to return the 12-month
follow-up.
7.1.4 What’s the Mechanism?
The main idea behind the intervention was to first help the CSOs by focusing on their
own needs via a type of behavioral activation. Then arrange for rewarding activities they
could to together with the gambler. These shared activities were thought to naturally
bring the gambler and CSO closer together, and introduce gambling-free activities to the
gambler. After those core activities had been established, we wanted the CSO to practice
how to communicate with the gambler about the gambling problem. We tried to place
rather little emphasis on the CSO being able to identify the actual gambling behavior.
It seems likely that many of the CSOs spent very little time practicing the skills intended
towards influencing the gambler. Personally, I think these skills would require a lot of
practice, preferably by role-playing different scenarios with the therapist. It is not easy to
change the dynamics in a dyadwhen emotions run hot. However, anecdotally, therewere
some CSOs who did practice these skills thoroughly and reported that they successfully
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improved how they communicate about gambling.
Lastly, a diﬀicult question is: were the CSO’s emotional problems caused by the problem
gambling? Most research on this topic is correlational. This question is related to the
potential measurement issues discussed earlier, one can rightfully ask if the changes in
the CSO’s emotional consequences (ICS) and in the depression (PHQ-9) symptoms and
anxiety (GAD-7) reflects a reduction in “gambling harms” and increased cooping—or
is the mechanisms similar to other ICBT interventions aimed at reducing depression
and anxiety? It is possible that we would have seen similar results on these outcomes if
the CSOs had telephone contact with a counselor that validated them, provided some
psychoeducation about gambling, and thenmotivated them to focus less on the gambling
and instead do “rewarding and fun activities”.
Clearly, these causal mechanisms will be heterogeneous. Some CSOs showed very little
emotional distress and did not suffer financial consequences—others were more directly
affected. It is possible that adherence and maybe outcomes could be improved if the
intervention is more tailored toward the CSOs specific situation. The original CRAFT
approach is more of a “smörgåsbord” with a more flexible treatment-planning than our
online intervention.
7.1.5 Agreement Between the CSO and Gambler
Study III provided some evidence that it is possible for CSOs and gamblers to show
a decent level of agreement in regards to gambling losses. It is likely that CSOs who
cohabit and have shared expenses have a better grasp on the losses—at least large relative
changes in losses. If the gambler reduces or quits their gambling, the CSO could notice
that the gambler can pay expenses and needs to borrow less money. Still, we know that
problem gamblers have managed to hide large losses for a long time from their loved
ones.
The obvious difference between the sample of gamblers and CSOs in Study III and Study
IV affect the transportability of the findings. The gamblers in Study III were willing to
begin treatment together with their CSOs, whereas the problem gamblers in Study IV
were treatment-refusing, making it plausible that they were actively trying to hide their
losses, i.e., the agreement would probably be even lower in such a sample. Currently,
there has been no research on the validity of collateral reports in such a sample.
Moreover, we only investigated agreement using the baseline reports, since we
wanted to avoid that the reports were influenced by the treatment. From a treatment
point-of-view, it would be interesting to see if agreement increases over time for dyads
receiving behavioral couples therapy versus CBT. However, the large number of missing
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observations will make such an analysis extremely hard to interpret.
7.1.6 Clinical Implications
The results in Study IV implies that CSOs can learn to cope better with the problem
gambling. However, we still knowvery little about how to help CSOs influence the actual
problem gambling or treatment-seeking behavior. Moreover, it is unclear if an internet
intervention is the preferred mode of delivery among CSOs. However, access to other
options will likely not become available nationwide in the foreseeable future. A reduced
version of our 10-week program might be worth evaluating in future studies.
7.2 Modeling Gambling Losses
It is hard to image that gambling losses fulfill the typical LMM assumptions, i.e.,
normally distributed residuals with a constant variance, an additive effect of treatment,
and multivariate normal random effects. The longitudinal two-part model proposed in
Study II is a priorimuch more plausible. The model can easily capture the fact that some
will completely stop gambling, and some will continue to gamble heavily. However,
many challenges remain when it comes to analyzing gambling losses as a treatment
outcome. Some of the issues are:
• Clinical significance: It is hard to define what a clinically significant improvement
would be. For some, a reduction in losses of 100 SEK per day would be clinically
relevant; for others, it would make no difference. Although we could use the
relative units an say that a 20% reduction is clinically relevant, it is not clear that
this is any more clinically meaningful.
• Recovery: A related issue is to try to define “recovery” from problem gambling.
Although, I consider the focus on “recovery” as a treatment outcome, an
unnecessary dichotomization of a continuous outcome (gambling losses).
Undoubtedly, a problem gambler will still have residual problems even if they
completely stop gambling, such as financial problems, gambling urges, and
relationship problems. However, it seems natural that the primary aim of a
gambling intervention should be to reduce the problematic gambling. Thus, when
evaluating the eﬀicacy of a treatment, what matters is if the treatment increases
the likelihood of staying abstinent, or lead to a reduction in the gambling losses.
In clinical practice, other significant comorbidities that patients might suffer from
can likely be targeted by combining treatments.
• Dropout: Some participants will drop out because they feel they are doing fine and
do not need any more treatment. For these participants, dropout might depend
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on the observed values (the MAR assumption). For others, they might drop out
because they relapse, or because they feel like the treatment is not helping or they
might not like their therapist and feel like they do not understand their gambling
problem. Whatever the reason is, the dropout process is likely to be a mix of
MAR and MNAR related mechanisms. Dropout will likely continue to be a major
challenge in gambling studies. What we can improve is to think harder about
appropriate sensitivity analyses. We can also include questions if the participant
think they will drop out before the next visit—information that could make the
MAR assumption more plausible.
• Long term effects: We know that study participants tend to stop gambling once
they enter treatment. Naturally, this change can not be caused by the contents of the
treatment and should be seen as an effect of the participant’s resolve to change their
behavior. Deciding to enter treatment might be enough to keep themmotivated to
abstain from gambling during the treatment period. Thus, the real treatment effect
would be the impact on the long-term outcomes, say, 5 to 10 years later. Clearly,
the effect of randomization will be long broken by that time, and dropout will be
an even greater issue. Still, preventing relapse, in the long run, might be where
differences between treatments would show up.
In addition to the issues just listed, it is not entirely clear how reliable retrospective
reports of gambling losses are. However, more and more gambling is tracked, and
gamblers can see how great their losses are. Thus, EMA or diary-type reports can be
even further improved by the aid of the tracked gambling data. The gambling field
might be one of the few clinical fields were the possibility exists of using behavioral
tracking to receive ecologically valid data on the problem behavior. For some type of
studies, it is even possible to collaborate with the gambling industry and have access
to transactional-level data. However, such collaborations are not uncontroversial; the
gambling industry does not always share the agenda of the researchers.
Lastly, one of themajor challenges in Study II is how to disseminate the proposedmodel.
I doubt it can be fit using SPSS, and even in R or SAS, it is not straight-forward and
most researchers might need to consult an expert. This is a major drawback for the
dissemination of a method.
7.3 Therapist Effects
Having discussed specific issues related to gambling studies, I will now focus on the
broader issue of therapist effects in treatment studies.
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7.3.1 Therapists, Do They Matter?
Little is known about how strong the therapist effect is, mostly because researchers
continue to use statistical models that blatantly ignore the existence of therapists.
Naturally, it is likely that the variance at the therapist level is much smaller compared
to the variance between patients. However, as we showed in Study I, the consequences
of ignoring this variance can have large consequences for the statistical tests.
There are many reasons why therapists might differ in their overall success. Some
might just have more skill on the relevant variables—whether that is their ability to
create expectations and alliance, or their adhererence to the specific ingredients of the
treatment. Some therapists might just underperform during the study; things could
happen in their private lives that affect their work, or there might be a problem at the
organizational level creating unrealistic working conditions.
It is important to note that therapist effects do not make the treatment effect invalid. If
the therapists in each arm are comparable, then the treatment effect will not be biased;
it will simply shift the whole distribution of therapists giving the treatment. Thus, the
difference between therapists at the 95th percentile in either treatment group is the same
as for therapists at the median in either treatment group. However, if the variances are
heterogeneous, i.e., different in each arm, then the therapistswill be a source of treatment
effect heterogeneity. This is also the case for a partially nested design, where, indeed, the
treatment effect is larger for a therapist at the 95th percentile compared to the expected
outcome in the control group. Figure 7.1 illustrate these three different scenarios.
An important question to ask is: Why do these distributions differ? In a nested design,
the therapists and treatments are confounded. The therapists giving treatment A could
be successful because they are more competent, which would inflate the estimated
treatment effect. This could be caused by the fact that a treatment that is more popular
and seen as more evidence-based might attract more ambitious and skilled therapists
as they know that this will improve their work opportunities. The relationship could
also be the reverse, i.e., there is no real difference between the therapists’ giving either
treatment. In this case, the overall difference mostly reflects the effect of the specific
treatment. Moreover, it is possible that there is no overall therapist effect, in the sense
that therapists would perform well using any treatment due to, for instance, their
mastery of common factors. In a nested design, it is not possible to partition out if
some of the variance is caused by a therapist × treatment interaction. It is possible that
all of the variance stems from an interaction between therapist characteristics and the
treatment—and that a “super therapist” only outperforms their peers when delivering
their preferred treatment. Clearly, all of this has a bearing on whether therapists or
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treatments are more important.
One could also look at Figure 7.1 and note that the overlap is substantial. There will
be therapists from the less beneficial treatment B that outperforms therapists from
treatment A. Based on such reasoning, some would claim that therapists are more
important than the treatment provided. However, it makes little sense to compare
therapists at different percentiles—and as noted earlier we do not know if it is the
therapists causing the treatment effects or if it is the treatment effects causing the
difference between therapists. However, if the distribution of the expected outcomes is
valid (i.e., it approximates the empirical distribution of the real therapists), then all of
these therapists will treat patients. Thus at the population level, our best guess would
be to pick treatment A, either because the treatment is better or because the therapists
delivering the treatment tend to be better. Clearly, if I was a patient and I had access
to this information, my best option would be to pick one of the top therapists giving
treatment A. Unfortunately, I do not have access to this information, and no one else
has, so again, my best option would be to pick a therapist from treatment A.
7.3.2 Fixed Versus Random Effects Again
The discussion regarding if therapists should be viewed as a fixed or random effect
is somewhat strange. The argument for random effects (varying effects) is about
generalizability. The confidence intervals will be wider for the treatment effect, as we
assume therapists are sampled from a distribution. This makes sense if we are thinking
about effectiveness. However, if we are primarily concerned with estimating the eﬀicacy
of a treatment, then conditioning on the therapists in the study makes sense. A problem
is that psychotherapy trials do not really have different phases, in the same way that
pharmacological trials do. It would make sense to use a fixed effects approach in the
early phases, where power is a major concern and where a type II error could lead to
abandoning research on a treatment that is indeed eﬀicacious. Before dissemination to
the general public, larger studies could be performed where therapists are a random
factor.
A third option is to perform a fixed effects analysis but adjust the standard errors, a
method more common in econometrics. There is no gain in power in doing this, but it
can be an attractive option if there is a concern about the validity of the random effects
(for instance, endogeneity concerns).
7.3.3 Identifying Factors That Explain Therapist Variance
If we can identify variables that explain some of the variance between therapists,
such as competence or experience, then measuring and including these variables in
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our models should increase the model’s precision by reducing the between-therapist
variance. Considering that most studies completely ignore therapist effects, this means
that very few good markers exist. Such problems can easily be avoided by publishing
de-identified data. Instead, thousands of studies have been performed that contained
useful information that could have been used to design better studies—unfortunately,
one can guess that most of the data sets are lost forever.
7.4 Psychotherapy Research—Looking Forward
After having spentmost of this thesis looking at the bad parts of psychotherapy research,
I will end this discussion by focusing on how things can be improved in the future.
7.4.1 Methods Issues and Dissemination
Awide-spread problem in research is that calls of concern frommethodologists continue
to be ignored. For example, the consequences of ignoring therapist effects have been
known for a long time, with little impact on the way investigators analyze and report
their trials. It is clear that just writing method papers is not enough to improve our
field. Most researchers in clinical psychology both lack strong quantitative training,
programming knowledge or have the prerequisite mathematical knowledge that they
would need to apply or evaluate many method papers. With the challenges often faced
in clinical psychology, it should not be surprising that clinical researchers struggle with
using modern computational tools. However, I do not think that the solution is to focus
solely on the individual researcher’s quantitative training. It is not reasonable to expect
clinical researchers to become quantitative and clinical experts simultaneously. The
issues we are facing need to be dealt with by reforming how we organize, reward, and
fund research. With that being said, I do think that the overall quantitative knowledge
needs to be improved. Not so that everyone should be able to code their own custom
analyses, but rather so that clinical investigators can ask better questions and better
evaluate the limitations and inferences in their trials.
The problem of disseminating quantitative methods shares many similarities with
the research-to-practice gap in healthcare, and several lessons from implementation
sciences can most likely apply to the research-to-practice gap in quantitative methods
(King, Pullmann, Lyon, Dorsey, & Lewis, 2019).
A specific issue that pertains to this thesis is how to disseminate method papers
best. Even the applied quantitative papers tend to be too technical for the typical
psychotherapy researcher. In many ways, quantitative scholars face a user interface (UI)
and user experience (UX) design problem. If a quantitative researcher wants to publish
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a new method (a new “product”) that researchers should use, then just publishing a
method paper, tend to lead to really sub-par UI and UX. Very few researchers will use
a method unless it is packaged in a user-friendly way, and unless the product includes
the features that match their needs. In my work, I have at least tried to go beyond just
publishing papers. I have tried to include more visual material and more user-friendly
alternatives. For instance, is my belief that many concepts can be explained better
using interactive visualizations (e.g., https://rpsychologist.com/d3/CI/), than just
static pictures or using formulas. For Study I, I created my R package powerlmm, which
can perform everything mentioned in the article (and more), and I included a web
application (a Shiny app) where the core features have a more user-friendly graphical
interface.
7.4.2 Causal Inference, Learning to Let Go of Experiments
Psychotherapy investigators tend to be most familiar with one of the most basic
experiments: the parallel-group randomized trial, where the only experimental
manipulation is the offering of recieving treatment or not. Often we fail to recognize
that many of the questions we are interested in are not experimentally manipulated,
such as process measures, per-protocol effects, or dose-response relationships. Which
can lead to investigators choosing analyses that are so naive that no one would have
faith in the results if all assumption were explicitly stated. Going forward we should
use our substantive knowledge and clinical experience together with modern causal
inference methods to try to discover causal effects with more realistic models—instead
of wasting our efforts on unrealistic mediation or predictive models.
We could also focus on basic science experiments to try to identify potential variables to
target in our treatments. For the reasons covered in Section 2.2.5, I am personally not that
optimistic that such an approach will substantially inform the practice of psychotherapy.
There is a concern that more novel and hyped experimental findings will lead to trials
with little hope of improving clinical outcomes, leading to an unnecessary waste of
research resources (Cristea & Florian, 2019).
7.4.3 Predictive Modeling Without Buzzwords
It is understandable that psychotherapy researchers, like so many others, have a hard
time resisting the hype of machine learning or “artificial intelligence” as a way of
improving treatment selection, predicting who will respond to treatment, or classifying
non-responders during the treatment. Indeed, labels such as “deep neural nets”,
“reinforcement learning”, or “artificial intelligence” does sound more state-of-the art
than “linear regression”. Unfortunately, few problems in psychotherapy research are
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solved by these models, and one can question the utility of models that gained their
popularity in situations with a high signal-to-noise ratio, such as in pattern recognition
problems, natural language processing, or building recommendation systems (i.e., “you
might also be interested in product X”). Anyone who have seen a decent amount of
psychotherapy data will know that our situation is quite the opposite.
I have seen several examples of both research funders and investigators that have bought
the hype of machine learning, unfortunately, with little knowledge of how to appreciate
what the good parts are—and how they apply to psychotherapy research. Although, one
can rightfully argue that many of the “machine learning” methods that might work well
for psychotherapy researchers are just “statistics”; such as cross-validation, appropriate
performance measures, penalized regression, and so on.
The literature on clinical prediction models is much larger in medicine compared to
psychotherapy research. Undoubtedly, a lot could be improved with regards to how
prediction or classification problems are handled in psychotherapy research. The first
would be to recognize what can actually be predicted (as covered in the background
section). Using patients’ improvement from baseline and trying to build a model that
will predict treatment response is doomed to fail. What would help is to instead build
better models for predicting patients’ prognosis. It is not a surprise that, in medicine,
it is with image recognition that machine learning algorithms have found their success,
e.g., detecting diabetic retinopathy based on retinal photographs (Beam&Kohane, 2018;
Gulshan et al., 2016).
7.4.4 “We Need Less Research, Better Research, and Research Done for the
Right Reasons”
Many of the issues I discuss would require changes to the way research is undertaken.
Hopefully, the days of psychotherapy trials being basically a solo venture are soon gone;
were one or two persons design the trial, carry out the treatment, analyze the results, and
publish the results with very little transparency or oversight. Clearly, this is problematic
even when investigators are conscientious and report everything transparently—no one
is an expert in all of the relevant skills.1
Instead of many small trials of this type, run by a single academic investigator, what
we need is large collaborations that include multiple institutions and with enough
resources to create research teams and support functions to run large high-quality
trials. This would allow teams to focus on: a) measurement problems before starting a
trial, b) evaluate interventions in several steps, starting with single-case experimental
1No, not even Paul Meehl.
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designs and where patients and clinicians can provide feedback on the contents of
interventions and if relevant outcomes are captured, c) include outcome measures
that are actually validated specifically for the problem being investigated, d) letting
clinicians, methodologists, psychometricians, and statisticians work together from the
start both to formulate relevant questions and methods to answer them. Cuijpers et al.
(2018b) reasoned similarly:
“It is as if we have been in the pilot phase of research for five decades
without being able to dig deeper. If we want to take a step forward, we need
to conduct research that goes beyond examining, on the one hand, simple
correlational associations between specific and common factors and, on
the other, outcomes … There are no easy solutions, and such research will
require considerable resources. However, we have invested resources in this
research for five decades, and if we could put only part of these resources
toward making a coordinated effort to examine mechanisms of change, it
would certainly become feasible” (p. 18)
Moreover, in order to realize this scientific utopia, researchers would need to publish less
in order to have the time to produce reliable research that is carefully thought through
and carried out. Obviously, this would require changing the incentive structures in
science and how researchers are promoted and recruited—a pretty daunting task.
7.4.5 Embrace Open Science
In order to create a cumulative and transparent research field data and scripts need to
be open, and psychotherapy researchers need to embrace open science practices. It is
a clear research waste that so much data on psychotherapy outcomes and processes are
unavailable, and perhaps, permanently lost. Open data and scripts also enable science to
be self-correcting; currently, it is close to impossible to check claims made in published
trials.
Science is not open if only those with the appropriate software licenses can run our
code—open science is best done using open software. Naturally, treatment manuals and
worksheets should be published using a permissive license so that others are free to use
and adapt the materials. These are simple steps that would improve the trustworthiness
of psychotherapy research substantively. With most of these items included in the most
recent CONSORT statement for social and psychological interventions (CONSORT-SPI;
Grant et al., 2018), maybe the situation will improve. For instance, item 12a states:
“To facilitate full reproducibility, authors should report software used to run
analyses and provide the exact statistical code” (p. 11)
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and item 17a:
“As part of the growing open-science movement, triallists are increasingly
expected to maintain their datasets, linked via trial registrations and posted
in trusted online repositories … to facilitate reproducibility of reported
analyses and future secondary data analyses” (p. 13)
Hopefully, psychotherapy researchers or funders recognize the importance of these
items.
7.4.6 Is it Time to Regulate Psychotherapy Research?
It is quite strange that psychotherapies (or “psychological treatments”) can be offered
by the Swedish (and other) healthcare systems without any specific regulation of the
psychotherapy research which is used to guide what treatments are offered.
It should be evident that the reporting of psychotherapy trials in academic journals is
a sub-optimal way of ensuring quality. When “psychological treatments” are included
in the healthcare system and provided by licensed psychologists, the evidence needs to
be evaluated independently by a responsible governing body. We cannot rely on simply
the published literature and base healthcare recommendations on systematic reviews
of this literature. A better approach would be to adopt the system for introducing new
medicines on themarketwhere there is a governing body and specific regulation, such as
the European Medicine Agency and the Swedish Läkemedelsverket. In order to reclaim trust
in the evaluation of psychotherapy interventions, trial data need to be independently
verified, and regulatory documents should detail how the research should be conducted
and how good clinical practice is ensured. After a psychotherapy is shown to be effective,
its implementation needs to be monitored, and guidelines are needed for how to train
therapists and what competencies are required.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
Undoubtedly, the challenges faced by psychotherapy researchers are monumental.
It is easy to sound negative when focusing mostly on research issues. Hopefully,
improvements to psychotherapy research will follow, and that these improvements will
improve clinical practice and reduce the mental health burden in general.
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of therapists’ expected outcome for two different treatments. In
a) the variance is equal in both treatments (at posttest ICC = 0.05), in b) there is a larger
variance in treatment A (at posttest ICC = 0.05 vs 0.08), in c) treatment B is a no-treatment
control condition (at posttest ICC= 0.05 in treatmentA). Comparison between treatments
are shown at the median and at the 95th percentile.
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